

Durkheim Revisited: Possible Contribution to the Understanding of Gramsci's Notion of Hegemony

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Abstract

The paper attempts to explore the possibility of using Durkheim to understand the Gramscian notion of hegemony building on the claim that Gramsci's idea is fragmentary and contentious.

Durkheim's concepts such as social solidarity, integration, rites and collective conscience the paper argues maybe deployed to comprehend Gramsci's notion of hegemony particularly consent generation. The paper also contends that Durkheim's ideas on the state and secondary groups/voluntary organizations (civil society) may be helpful in explaining the Gramscian concept of consent building. In effect, the paper also tries to demonstrate that sociological positions that are viewed as rivals can complement each other. Sociologists should do more explorations in areas of convergence rather than divergence of sociological positions.

Keywords: hegemony, social solidarity, consent, civil society, state

INTRODUCTION

Among the founding fathers of sociology, Emile Durkheim was sidelined from the 1960's to the 1980's with the emergence of the "conflict school" and the pre-occupation of many sociologists on historical-comparative sociology. Most of these sociologists turned to either Marx or Weber for insights and guidance. Charles Tilly's 1981 essay "Useless Durkheim" highlights this trend in American sociology. More than a decade after Tilly's essay came out, Mustafa Emirbayer responded to "Useless Durkheim" with "Useful Durkheim" in 1996. He believes the "repudiation of Durkheim as a historical-comparative-



sociologist' in those decades is due to his identification "with the much-maligned structural-functionalism and evolutionism of Talcott Parsons." He notes, however, that recent developments in sociology "led to a renewed interest on the ideas and insights of Durkheim "as a historical analyst" (Emirbayer 1996:110). In the article, he further contends that the "emergence of new (micro)sociology of the emotions for example, directed sociologists' attention to the examination of the mechanism of social solidarity. Scholarship on substantive topics of civil society and the emergence of relational sociology which looks at social life as "networks and transactions, rather than as either 'substantial entity having corporate existence' (Alpert 1961:151) or a mere aggregation of individual" revitalized interest on Durkheim (Emirbayer 1996:110).

According to Emirbayer "Durkheim's perspective on history" offers new light on the problems dealt with by historical-comparative sociologists. For him, Durkheim's works such as – "*Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* (1992), *The Evolution of Educational Thought* (1977), and *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1995) "highlighted the significance of civic and public interactions, shared emotions, material configurations, and the sacred in social life" (Emirbayer 1996:111-112). For such reasons, he thinks, that Durkheim ideas are most useful in the study of civil society. "Of all classical social thinkers, it is surely Durkheim himself (along with Tocqueville) who provides the most perceptive analysis of the structures and processes of civil society. It is the intermediate domains of social life – the domestic, associational, and public institutions of society – that Durkheim analyzes most acutely" (Emirbayer 1996:112). Here, Emirbayer notes that among the classical thinkers, it is Durkheim who had a more extensive if not sophisticated view of civil society. Durkheim's notion of associational groups is akin to the Gramscian's concept of civil society.

Furthermore, Emirbayer contends that Durkheim more than Marx insight fully explores "the logic of these structures and practices, and assesses their contributions to social integration, individual autonomy, and willed community" more and in a way "anticipates Parson's (1967, 1977) important investigations into the dynamics of 'social community,' Gramsci's (1971) studies of 'hegemony,' and the now-burgeoning research on civil society" (1996:113).

If Durkheim as Emirbayer posits anticipated Gramsci's hegemony in his work, this paper examines a junction between

Durkheim and Gramsci. Are the ideas of Durkheim useful and helpful to clarify and explain Gramsci's notion of hegemony? Is there something that can be extracted from the works of one of the founding fathers of sociology to understand hegemony developed by Gramsci especially consent? What are the possible pathways where their views intersect?

This paper aims to explore the above questions by first discussing Gramsci's notion of hegemony. Included in the discussion are the contentions on the Gramscian hegemony as observed by some scholars. Two works are cited as examples of attempts to expound on hegemony building. The first is the work of Marxist scholar Michael Burawoy's (1982), particularly how consent is manufactured in the workplace is cited as one of the attempts to flesh out the Gramscian notion. The other is the work of Michael Rodriguez-Muñiz (2017) on building consent through civil society. Lastly, the paper brings in Durkheim and explores the possibility of using his concepts such as integration, social solidarity, rituals, and collective consciousness to understand the Gramscian notion of hegemony. The Gramscian and Durkheimian notions of the civil society and state in relation to hegemony building are also presented.

From among the neo-Marxist thinkers, the paper chose to examine Antonio Gramsci's position because it is Gramsci who expands or extends Marx' view on what holds society together with his notion of hegemony. Perhaps due to his early death and his terrible prison conditions, Gramsci was not able to fully conceptualize his idea of hegemony. Durkheim's ideas can be deployed to unravel the generation and reproduction of consent and enrich our understanding of Gramsci's notion of hegemony.

Gramsci's Hegemony

The concept of hegemony is perhaps Gramsci's most notable contribution to social and political theory. However, hegemony as conceptualized by Gramsci is not systematically discussed in his works. This fragmented and unorganized presentation of hegemony created debates among scholars on the notion leading to various interpretations of the concept.

Gramsci's idea of hegemony first appeared in an earlier article, *Some Aspects of the Southern Question*. In his seminal work *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci elaborates hegemony, going beyond mere class alliance but did not extensively discuss it. There is no specific section in the book that is solely devoted to hegemony but reference to it or its concept is scattered in many parts of the work.

In the section on intellectuals of *Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci discusses their role in society. The intellectuals according to Gramsci exercise "the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government" (1971:12). He further says that social hegemony and political government comprise "spontaneous consent" and "apparatus of state coercive power." Here Gramsci (1971:12) is saying hegemony has two elements or components, consent, and coercion.

'Spontaneous' consent is given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production.

The apparatus of state coercive power which is 'legal' enforces discipline on those groups who do not 'consent' either actively or passively.

Gramsci also mentioned that hegemony is a combination of coercion and consent symbolized by "Machiavelli's Centaur – half-animal, half-human. They are the levels of force and consent, authority, and hegemony" (1971:180-183). In the same section Gramsci also explains the three levels of relation of forces and how a class achieves hegemony, by presenting its interest as the interest of everyone.

Hegemony for Gramsci also means a group leading other groups in a particular juncture of social change like revolution. In *Some Aspects of the Southern Question*, Gramsci also argues that the proletariat as a "hegemonic class" wins over "the broad peasant masses" by 'gaining their consent' in a class alliance "against capitalism and the bourgeois State" (1978:4). A similar view is also expressed in the Notes on Italian History section (1971:104-106) where Gramsci notes the Piedmont State achieved "hegemony" by its dominance of the Italian Risorgimento.

According to Gramsci, the Piedmont State functioned as “that of a ruling class” (1971:104).

In the section on the State and Civil society, however, Gramsci defines the “state as dictatorship + hegemony” (1971:239). He further writes that “State = political society + civil society; i.e., protected by the armor of coercion” (Gramsci 1971:262-263). Here Gramsci seems to be saying that hegemony resides on the state and is one of its functions.

On the role of intellectuals’ section of *Prison Notebooks* Gramsci refers to hegemony as both coercion and consent as well as in the section on the Modern Prince where Machiavelli’s Centaur represents its two components. In State and Civil Society section, however, hegemony seems to reside in civil society while in Notes on Italian History and Southern Question, it is domination or political leadership. But the domination of the Piedmont State is through its leadership of the Risorgimento implying that it exercises coercion and generates consent from other groups.

How hegemony emerged in the economic sphere is discussed by Gramsci in Americanism and Fordism. In the passage below, hegemony is both force and persuasion.

Recall here the experiments conducted by Ford and to the economies made by his firm through direct management of transport and distribution of product. These economies affected production costs and permitted higher wages and lower selling prices. Since these preliminary conditions existed and already rendered rational by historical evolution, it was relatively easy to rationalize production and labor by a skillful combination of force (destruction of working-class trade unionism on a territorial basis) and persuasion (high wages, various social benefits, extremely subtle ideological and political propaganda) and, thus, succeed in making whole life of the nation revolve around production. Hegemony here is born in the factory and requires for its exercise only a minute quantity of professional political intermediaries (Gramsci 1971:285).

Fordism is Henry Ford’s hegemonic project in his factories, co-opting his workers through high wages and fringe benefits while neutralizing unions through intimidation. The Fordist system forged

a labor-management pact which leads to the “shaping of the new rationality of the working class...the actual internalization of these industrial requirements...became parts of the new way of life for the industrial proletariat” (Bonanno 2017:40). Workers’ internalization of the Fordian ideology leads to their social integration in the Fordist regulated capitalism. This is done Gramsci (1971:310) notes through the ingenious combination of persuasion and consent.

On the whole, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is domination of a group or a class. This domination or hegemony involves coercion and consent, force, and persuasion. In some passages especially on politics Gramsci seems to identify hegemony with consent and separates it from coercion but in other passages especially on economics, hegemony consists of force and coercion. It can be gleaned from the *Prison Notebooks* that hegemony encompasses the political and economic spheres and Gramsci discusses it in each area. Given the fragmentary presentation of hegemony in *Prison Notebooks*, the term has been the subject of controversy and debate.

Contentions on the Notion of Hegemony

Whether hegemony involves both coercion and consent or only consent both are key ingredients for a group or a class to dominate or lead other groups in society. Coercion which requires force, intimidation or threat is very apparent when employed. The deployment of the coercive apparatus of the state is the clearest manifestation of the forceful imposition of a group of its will over other groups.

How consent is generated or produced is, however, contentious. Winning or getting consent by a group from other groups is not a matter of deception or trickery. Consent entails agreement or permission. The dominated groups give their approval of the existing arrangement between them and the dominant or hegemonic group. This willingness of the dominated groups or consenting to the unequal condition they are in is not the result of them being blind to their situation. They consent not because they are unable to see the asymmetrical structure that is disadvantageous to them but because they accept it. When the dominated group consents, they sanction or allow the prevailing imbalanced set up to exist.

It is perplexing why the disadvantaged group would consent or agree to an arrangement that is detrimental to them. Why does the dominated group accede to such arrangement and how does the dominant group gain the approval or the consent of the subjugated groups?

Gramsci is vague on this. In *Prison Notebooks*, he mentions that consent is done by the “educative and formative role of the State” through the school. The State also generates consent by means of civil society (Gramsci 1971:242, 458-459). In the economic sphere, Gramsci says capitalists persuade workers through benefits and some privileges. However, he never explains the processes or pointed out the mechanisms that create or reproduce consent.

Some scholars also observe that Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is subject to disputation. Anderson (2017) notes that Gramsci’s hegemony “included both the extraction by rulers of consent from the ruled, and the deployment of coercion to enforce their rule. As his originating formulations make clear, Gramsci’s intention was to conjugate the two. But his notes in prison were fragmentary and exploratory, not finished or cohesive, allowing for oscillations or inconsistencies in expression” (Anderson 2017:12). He points out the fragmentary and unfinished aspect of Gramsci’s concept, thus, leaving room for inconsistencies.

There are difficulties in interpreting the work of Gramsci according to Femia (1973). The difficulty is because “his thoughts are not arranged in logical sequences and organic wholes: nowhere are his ideas systematically expounded” (Femia 1973:30). Nothing clearly illustrates this difficulty for Femia than Gramsci’s notion of hegemony. Gramsci’s “disjointed exposition of the concept raises a host of difficult and controversial issues” (1973:29) Femia argues. He raises some problems related to hegemony. “First, there is the problem of determining the precise nature of hegemony. Roughly, the term refers to a situation where a social group or class is ideologically dominant. But what exactly does this mean? Then, there is the question of how a hegemony arises” (Femia 1973:29).

Gramscian concept of hegemony was hailed by Thomas (2013:20) as “a singular ‘success’ of the vocabulary of the Marxist tradition.” But he also concedes that the “word seems to have very different when not directly contradictory meanings ascribed to it,

leaving new and old readers alike uncertain as to its precise theoretical significance or contemporary relevance” (Thomas 2013:21). Maglaras (2013) agrees with Thomas. “The concepts of hegemony and ideology in Gramsci, due to the particular content and the nonsystematic form of the theory itself, have created multiple problems to interpreters of his work, as far as understanding and demonstrating the existence of a clear relationship between them is concerned” (Maglaras 2013:4).

The abovementioned scholars agree that Gramsci’s notion is contentious and there is difficulty and problem in interpreting the concept. Some scholars tried to deal with the difficulty by investigating how hegemony is created in the workplace. One of them working in the Marxist tradition explains the generation or reproduction of consent in the factory setting.

Manufacturing Consent

Michael Burawoy (1982) attempted to flesh out Gramsci’s hegemony in his major work *Manufacturing Consent*. In an ethnographic study to understand the labor process, Burawoy noted that capitalist exploitation is not just despotic but also involves “a more hegemonic methodology of co-optation and subtle coercion” (hazelsapien.blogspot). Inverting the Marxist question “Why do workers work at all (given their interests are opposite of the capitalists?” (hazelsapien.blogspot). Burawoy instead asks, “Why do workers work as hard as they do (knowing their efforts merely make more money for the company owners)?” Capitalism for Burawoy “is distinct in how it creates consent and conflict” (hazelsapien.blogspot).

In his study, Burawoy found out that workers consent through the process of making-out. It involves a piece-rate system which “created the illusion of labor as a game” to the workers. Workers in the piece-rate system found that aside from their wage, they can increase their income by rising their quotas and cutting-time.

Workers engage in various ‘making out’ behavior, such as *goldbricking* (the slackening of output because it is very unlikely one will surpass the base wage), *banking* (producing over the 140% capacity, and then keeping the surplus for the next shifts kitty); and *chiseling* (where workers redistribute

time on time sheet so as to show fudged amount of time per job so as to meet surplus incentive rates (hazelsapien.blogspot).

To “make-out” workers have to cooperate with each other since they have to circumvent the system and ignore the rules in the shop floor. In situation where the management increases the incentives for individuals and makes it difficult for workers to coordinate, the piece-rate system breeds competitiveness among them, thus, disabling their capacity to unite.

Workers compete with each other to “make out” and surpass their expected production quotas. Over time the job satisfaction came from mastering the intricate and often devious strategies to “make out” under various production conditions. Those more skillful in ‘playing all the angles’ garnered the most respect and prestige (hazelsapien.blogspot).

According to Burawoy, the game of making out generates consent. “Firstly, it represents the link between individual rationality and the rationality of the capitalist system. Secondly, just as playing a game generates consent to its rules, so as participating in the choices of capitalism forces us to generate consent to its rules, its norms. Thirdly, just as game defines a set of goals, so capitalism generates a set of interests. Fourthly, just as the possibility of winning or maximizing ones utility makes a game seductive, so is the possibility of realizing one’s interests, of satisfying ones needs...is the very means of generating consent to the rules and relations, presenting them as natural and inevitable” (Burawoy 1982:91-92).

Burawoy is saying that workers consent by playing the game of making-out linking their rationality with that of the capitalist system.

Another scholar looked at how hegemony, especially consent is generated through civil society. Gramsci considered civil society as an important site of hegemony generation.

Cultivating Consent

As earlier presented, the Gramscian hegemony seems to reside in civil society (Gramsci 1971:262-63). Buttigieg (1995) expounds that “for Gramsci, civil society is best described not as the sphere of

freedom but of hegemony. Hegemony, to be sure, depends on consent (as opposed to coercion), but consent is not the spontaneous outcome of 'free choice'; consent is manufactured, albeit through extremely complex media, diverse institutions, and constantly changing processes" (1995:6-7).

Civil society can serve as a medium of consent generation. This role of civil society in cultivating consent is explored by Michael Rodriguez-Muñiz. His study examines the employment of a civil society group in a state project to gain consent from the populace.

Moving away from a 'state-centered' to 'society-centered' sociology in the sociology of the state, Michael Rodriguez-Muñiz investigated the role of non-state actors in the orchestration of state legibility. His study revolves on this question: How have non-state leaders (i.e., civil leaders and community advocates) contributed to what James Scott has termed "state legibility"? He introduced the concept of *consent building*, how non-state actors generated support and cooperation from the public on a state activity, in this case the 2010 US census.

Drawing from Scott, state legibility for Rodriguez-Muñiz is "a knowledge-based optic that has enabled state actors to see society in administratively efficacious ways. State legibility rests on ongoing production of 'synoptics, standardized knowledge' of society" (Rodriguez-Muñiz 2017:386). Production of knowledge from the point of state legibility is at the center of modern statecraft. Generation of such knowledge, however, is not easy and fraught with resistance from the public.

The 'state centered' approach to state legibility focuses on the state actors and agencies as primarily involved in knowledge production. This is the standpoint Scott adopted Rodriguez- Muñiz said which views state legibility "primarily from the vantage point of state elites" (2017:389). Citing Emigh et al., Rodriguez-Muñiz (2017:389) pointed out the "five ways that the state-centered orientation inflates the 'influence of states.'" These are: "exaggerates the correlation between state power and information gathering; overstates the ability of the state to impose novel categories on the populace and to extract entirely new information, either in form or content; overemphasizes the role of state bureaucrats in developing and implementing censuses; ignores

how the power of social actors influences information gathering;" and "exaggerates the extent to which any states' intentions or goals drive information gathering" (Rodriguez-Muñiz 2017:389).

The 'society-centered' approach is proposed by Emigh et al. not to replace the 'state-centered' approach but to cure its "conceptual and substantive imbalance" (Rodriguez-Muñiz 2017:389). Their purpose is to "reveal that knowledge production is, in fact, an 'interactive process' involving state and social actors" (Rodriguez-Muñiz 2017:389).

One of the major hindrances to knowledge production Rodriguez-Muñiz noted is popular reticence and resistance to state legibility projects like census. To overcome the problem of non-compliance, he mentioned instances here where the state employed coercive measures such as "fines and physical force" (Rodriguez-Muñiz 2017:390) as well as the utilization of non-state leaders by the state to counter resistance. He observed, however, the scarcity of materials on the collaborations between state-actors and non-state actors in state legibility and "obscured a key investment of non-state leaders – consent building" (Rodriguez-Muñiz 2017:391).

In the context of his study, Rodriguez-Muñiz defined consent as "a willingness, on the part of the governed, to cooperate with state projects" (2017:391). Building this consent for him is "neither automatic nor permanent" (Rodriguez-Muñiz 2017:391). Recalling Gramsci "who argued that consent, while at times appearing 'spontaneous,' is actually the result of organized ideological work, thus, demands continual cultivation," (Rodriguez-Muñiz 2017:391) he departs from Scott's 'state-centered' approach to state legibility. Consensus-building for Rodriguez-Muñiz is efforts undertaken by state actors and their non-state collaborators to transform popular noncompliance into cooperation by means of persuasion" (2017:391).

Rodriguez-Muñiz laid down five parameters of his study on consent building. First, he restricted it on a *particular* state project. Second, he conceived "consensus building as an *intentional* practice" and third, views it as a *coordinated* effort. Fourth, "consent building aims to procure the consent of some perceived *aggregate* of people such as 'nation' or 'population'" and finally, "consent building operates primarily through *persuasion*." With these parameters, he investigated

the “consensus building for state projects of eligibility” (2017:392) focusing on three issues, namely, motives, obstacles, and tactics.

On the issue of motives, Rodriguez-Muñiz explored “Why have non-state actors chosen to engage in consent building? What motivates their efforts?” (2017:392). On the second issue of obstacles, he raised these questions. “What are the sources of noncompliance, as perceived and engaged by non-state leaders?” (Rodriguez-Muñiz 2017:393). On matter of tactics, he sought to “identify appeals crafted and circulated to overcome obstacles of noncompliance” (2017:394).

The study utilized quantitative and ethnographic data from the Rhode Island Latino Complete Count Committee (RILCCC), one of the local campaigns organized by the US government to promote public participation in 2010 census. The data were collected between February 2010 and March 2011 which involved in-depth interviews with 22 individuals (with several follow-ups interviews). While majority of the study participants were from RILCCC, informants also includes “local officials, journalists, regional census officials, and temporary census employees, such as partnership specialists and enumerators” (Rodriguez-Muñiz 2017:394). Aside from interviews, Rodriguez-Muñiz also did participant observation at events related to the 2010 census. Data were analyzed on the three issues namely; motives, obstacles, and tactics.

Results of the study reveal that in terms of motive, “the RILCCC were strongly motivated by the desire for data. Prior censuses convinced these non-state leaders that statistical proof of the size and growth of the Latino population was indispensable to what they understood as Latino political empowerment. Census data were perceived as sources of recognition and identification” (Rodriguez-Muñiz 2017:415). Moreover, for Rodriguez-Muñiz, statistical figures “can become ‘fact-totems,’ or powerful collective representations that articulate deep meanings and emotional response. State legibility was, in this case, both and incentive for – and outcome of – non-state consensus building” (2017:416).

Main obstacle to the census is the resistance of the Latino community due to concerns on privacy and confidentiality, safety (for the illegals), distrust of the government, and the boycott of the census initiated by some members of the community. “In this context, non-state leaders assumed the task of mediating complex relations between

the census and local populations” (Rodriguez-Muñiz 2017:416). Thus, “the RILCCC case suggests that even seemingly institutionalized state projects may require consent building” (Rodriguez-Muñiz 2017:416).

RILCC deployed various tactics to promote the census in the community. “These ranged from efforts to convince local residents that the census would translate into increased federal funds to the invocation of legal statutes to persuade that the census poses no risk. Analysis of the RILCCC tactics reveals that, while the group sponsored its own events and press conferences, it also used other local as conduits to reach beyond its immediate networks and constituencies” (Rodriguez-Muñiz 2017:417). The tactics targeted the popular perceptions of state projects to build consent. “Consent building is, thus, one of the ways that non-state leaders can manage or attempt to manage how the ‘state comes into views’” (Rodriguez-Muñiz 2017:417).

The study of Rodriguez-Muñiz shows that non-state groups like RILCCC play a vital role in building consent for state projects like census. Non-state actors like RILCCC serve as intermediaries between the state and the population and can generate support for state legibility projects.

Burawoy and Rodriguez-Muñiz sought to explain hegemony, particularly consent generation and enriched it by looking at the sites where it is cultivated. The factory was the place where Burawoy did his investigation while Rodriguez-Muñiz selected civil society. The works of Burawoy and Rodriguez-Muñiz are important contributions to the contentious debate on Gramscian hegemony as earlier pointed out.

Is it also possible that Durkheim’s concepts of social integration, rituals, rites, social solidarity and collective conscience or consciousness could be of help to unravel the puzzle why the dominated groups consent? For example, are Durkheim’s concepts of social integration and social solidarity useful in understanding why the workers play the game of making out? Can Gramscian hegemony be clarified or explained by Durkheim’s ideas?

Social Solidarity, Integration, Rites, and Collective Consciousness

Durkheim’s concept of social solidarity, integration, rites, and collective consciousness can be of help to unravel Gramsci notion of hegemony. This is discussed in the subsequent section.

Durkheim is concerned with what holds society together. He laid out his position in *The Division of Labor in Society* where he analyzed the transformation of society from mechanical to organic and the differences of the integration in the two societies. Mechanical solidarity is present in pre-modern societies characterized by close ties, similarities or likeness among people (Durkheim 1960:70) and very traditional. Modern societies on the other hand, are bound by organic solidarity based on the division of labor (Durkheim 1960:131). Through social solidarity, people are integrated in society. For Durkheim “solidarity *sui generis*...directly links the individual with society” (Durkheim 1960:106). In modern society people are socially integrated through the division of labor.

Furthermore, Durkheim links division of labor to reciprocity and cooperation. “Reciprocity is possible only where there is cooperation, and that, in its turn, does not come about without the division of labor. “To cooperate, in short, is to participate in a common task” (Durkheim 1960:124). For Durkheim “social harmony comes essentially from the division of labor. It is characterized by a cooperation which is automatically produced through the pursuit by each individual of his own interests” (Durkheim 1960:200). He also argues that in a society, an individual focus on a special function to be in solidarity with others. Division of labor for Durkheim promotes cooperation and this is possible when individual accepts his special function or place in the division of labor. Such acceptance can be a form of consent. When an individual accepts or consents to his place in the division of labor he also in a way accepts the existing social arrangement, thus, making that structure hegemonic.

Division of labor is prominent in factories where workers are grouped into specialized jobs. Burawoy found that to play the game of making out workers have to cooperate with each other. By playing it, workers have accepted the system they are in. They maximize the benefits they get from the system through the said game. Viewing this from Durkheim’s perspective, the workers are being socially integrated into the capitalist system through the mechanism of ‘making-out’ identifying or even tying their interest with the system that exploits them. Emirbayer pointed out that social solidarity as ‘the universal concomitant of group action’ is Durkheim’s idea. In short, ‘making-out’ have integrative effect embedding the workers in the capitalist system

and in a way answers Burawoy's question why the workers work as hard as they do in an exploitative system.

The capitalist system manufactures consent by integrating the workers within the system through the game of 'making-out and bonding them to the system. Social integration in a way generates consent. The game of making-out also creates strong bond among the workers. Emirbayer citing Durkheim's *The Evolution of Educational Thought* draws attention to the "integrative bonds" of the variations in solidarity. In that work of Durkheim, he notes the bond among the Jesuits. "Durkheim portrays the Jesuits as a group bound tightly together by dense matrices of emotional ties" and sees them "in pursuit of their goals, as engaged in action that was both instrumentally rational and expressive in nature" (Emirbayer 1996:119). In the same manner, "in playing the game of 'making out', workers do away with what would, otherwise, likely be a source of conflict, and find ways to work cooperatively, and simultaneously benefit from the very system that is attempting to oppress them" (hazelsapien.blogspot).

Aside from the concept of the game of 'making-out' as a way of manufacturing consent in the work place Burawoy also developed the "idea of 'rituals of affirmation' – particularly the productivity meetings – which establish a similar hegemony within 'bureaucratic despotic' factory regimes of 'state socialism'" (Tuckman and Whitehall 2002:68). Burawoy recalled an incident during his time as a worker at the Lenin Steel Works in Hungary where they were given paintbrushes to gloss over the grime of production. He later found out that the Prime Minister is visiting the plant and the order was given to impress him. "It is in both management and workers' interest to conspire in 'rituals of affirmation' which make it appear that the system is working. They were 'painting socialism' in ritual of affirmation to the ideology of the regime obscuring the reality of that regime"(Tuckman and Whitehall 2002:71).

Rituals of affirmation have a Durkheimian flavor. Going back to the work of Durkheim in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Emirbayer writes, "Durkheim often sees rituals and ceremonials - and, more broadly, moments of collective effervescence – as potentially creative and dynamic moments." Emirbayer sees "rituals is a weapon, usable by some groups to dominate others, by manipulating emotional solidarity as well as lines of group identification to the advantage of

some and the disadvantage of others.” Furthermore, social actors often make explicit appeals in the course of ritual ceremonies to the most fundamental, cherished values of their society. These values comprise what Edward Shils (1982), in distinctively Durkheimian formulation calls the ‘sacred center’ of society” (Emirbayer 1996:123).

Durkheim defines rites as “particular modes of action” (1995:34). Rites, which are either positive (venerate sacred objects) or negative (protect sacred objects from impurity) are followed by the tribes and Durkheim notes a pattern in their observance. Tribe members – men, women and even children go to a special place to perform rituals related to the sacred object. Collective experience generated by rituals has powerful effect on group life.

It is through them that the group affirms and maintains itself, and we know how indispensable the group is to the individual. Thus, a rite is something other than a game; it belongs to the serious side of life. First and foremost, rites are means by which the social group reaffirms itself periodically (Durkheim, 1995:386, 390).

Rituals not only create social solidarity, they can also be employed to generate consent. Rituals of affirmation like production meetings and brigade competitions in factories as Burawoy studied are also ways of manufacturing consent. Durkheim’s analysis on the impact of rituals on individuals and groups may explain why rituals of affirmation produce and reproduce consent in the workplace.

Aside from social solidarity, ritual, and rites, Durkheim’s notion of collective conscience or consciousness may also be helpful to understand Gramscian hegemony and its generation. Collective conscience or consciousness is defined by Durkheim as:

The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society forms a determinate system which has its own life; one may call it the collective or common conscience. It is, thus, an entirely different thing from particular consciences, although it can be realized only through them (Durkheim 1960:79-80).

As the totality of beliefs and sentiments of society, Durkheim believes collective conscience or consciousness binds the individuals

to society and holds society together. Values and norms of society when collectively shared by individuals have a force of holding society as a collectivity. Binding society and holding it together is the function of collective conscience or consciousness.

Collective conscience or consciousness maintains society by providing justification for its existence and getting the consent of its members which in turn produces hegemony. Consent is generated by collective conscience or consciousness for through shared beliefs or sentiments, members of society accept the existing social arrangements or structure. Collective conscience or consciousness legitimizes the existing social order and this legitimacy makes it hegemonic. Shared beliefs and sentiments make everyday life in society tolerable and even bearable by providing it ideological explanation if not justification. In a way, consent is produced or formed by collective conscience or consciousness. Durkheim is clear on this in the following passage.

The uneasiness which results from contrary aspirations is not enough to turn those who harbor them against the social order which is their cause, for they cling to this social order, not because they find in it the necessary field for the development of their occupational activity, but because it contains a multitude of beliefs and practices by which they live. They cling to it because their whole internal life is linked with it, because all their convictions presuppose it, because, serving as a basis for the moral and religious order, it appears to them as sacred. Private disturbances of a temporal nature are evidently too slight to upset states of conscience which derive such an exceptional force from such an origin. Moreover, as occupational life is but little developed, these disturbances are only intermittent. For all these reasons, they are weakly felt. They occur without trouble ensuing. Men even find inequalities not only tolerable but natural (Durkheim 1960:379 - 380).

Caperchi (2012) in his interpretation of Gramsci argues that “hegemony is a power which saturates, influences, and permeates all aspects of one’s life: the economic, cultural, social, ethical, political, and so on. In doing so, it shapes and molds consciousness, conceptions of common sense and world-views.” Collective consciousness or conscience performs this function - shaping the world-views of its members, and it also permeates in all aspects of their lives.

In similar vein, Gamson contends that “Gramsci recognized there is no automatic passage from economic to political dominance. Consent must be created and actively maintained. He calls our attention not only to explicit beliefs but also to how the routine, taken-for-granted everyday structures contribute to a structure of dominance” (1992:66). These taken-for-granted, routine structures are part of collective consciousness or conscience. As Gamson points out, beliefs, routine and taken-for-granted structures can create and actively maintain consent for they form the shared beliefs and values of society.

In a way, collective conscience or consciousness creates hegemony for the existing social order by cultivating consensus. Durkheim’s notion of collective conscience or consciousness can be deployed to expand or even enrich the understanding of Gramsci’s hegemony.

Another way of understanding hegemony is exploring the role of civil society in consent generation. This is another area where Durkheim’s ideas on voluntary groups/associations may enrich the Gramscian notion of hegemony.

Durkheim’s view on voluntary organizations/associations is useful in analyzing the role of civil society groups like RILCC in winning consent for state by connecting it to the general population. While Durkheim never mentioned “civil society” in his works, his notion of voluntary groups/associations can be extended to include civil society in the Gramscian sense.

The following discussion on civil society and consent building that focuses on Durkheim’s work on voluntary organizations/associations which as mentioned before are parallel to civil society further elaborates this.

Civil Society and Consent Building

Durkheim, Emirbayer claims can be useful in studying groups like RILCC which is part of civil society. “It is the intermediate domains of social life – the domestic, associational, and public institutions of society – that Durkheim analyzes most acutely: not only in the Tocquevillean domain of political society (or the ‘public sphere’), but also the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations

(especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication” (Emirbayer 1996:112-113). Emirbayer argues that Durkheim, more than Marx had insights fully explored the logic of civil society and assessed “their contributions to social integration, individual autonomy, and willed community” (1996:113).

In the space between the State and individuals lies civil society or what Durkheim calls “secondary groups.” He devoted the entire preface of the second edition of *The Division of Labor in Society* discussing about them. Durkheim traces the historical development, from corporations to occupation groups of these secondary groups. Durkheim posits that “the State is too remote from the individuals” (1960:28) thus, the need for an intermediary group.

A nation can be maintained only if between the state and the individual, there is inter-related whole series of secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the general torrent of social life (Durkheim 1960:28).

What Durkheim said on the interface between the State, secondary groups or civil society and individuals in the preface of the second edition of *The Division of Labor in Society*, he elaborates in the posthumously published *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*. His view on secondary groups (civil society) is clearer in the work.

But it is obvious that the State is too far removed from things and individuals to be able to carry out tasks so vast and so complex with any competence. There would be secondary groups, more limited in range and closer to the facts in detail, to be able to fulfill this function. We could hardly choose any better suited to the task than the professional groups. They are well equipped to manage any particular set of interests and could branch out into all parts of the country; at the same time, they would take into account the regional differences and purely local affairs. They would satisfy all the conditions for becoming in a sense, in the economic sphere, the heirs of the family (Durkheim 1950:218).

Secondary groups (or civil society) for Durkheim act as bridge between the state and individuals. Because of its role as intermediary,

secondary groups (civil society) are links of the State to the people and, thus, are helpful in generating consent for state projects. Durkheim points out that the state is too remote from the population and this distance makes it hard for the state to gain the support of the population for its initiatives. Secondary groups or civil society groups fill-in the “in-between” space between individuals and the state. The study of Rodriguez-Muñiz had shown that by being at the intersection of state and individuals, civil society groups like the RILCC can build consent for state projects such as census. Secondary groups (civil society) Durkheim says can attract and drag people to social life and this is what RILCC did when it mobilized the Latino populace to participate in the census, thus, building consent for the project. It is here that Durkheim’s perceptive analysis of civil society becomes useful as Emirbayer points out.

Besides building consent, Durkheim further argues that as mediator between the state and individuals “secondary groups are essential if the state is not to oppress the individual” (Durkheim 1950:97). He points that in situations where the state becomes despotic and repressive “it must be restrained by other collective forces, that is, by those secondary groups” (Durkheim 1950:63).

In similar vein, Gramsci also conceives civil society as “a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks” (1971:238) beyond the state and is legally neutral that “operates without sanctions or compulsory obligations, nevertheless, exerts a collective pressure and obtains objective results in the form of an evolution of customs, ways of thinking and acting, morality, and so on” (1971:242). Here, Gramsci implies that civil society is a separate sphere, and like Durkheim’s secondary groups, can be a site in the generation of consent for they can shape the individuals’ way of thinking and acting, even their morality.

Aside from civil society, it is also through the state that hegemony is created. There is junction in Gramsci and Durkheim’s the view of the state. The succeeding section presents the Durkheimian and Gramscian perspectives on the state and how it manufactures hegemony.

The State and Consent Generation

The notion of the state is another area where Durkheim and Gramsci’s views not only intersect but where consent and eventually

hegemony is generated. There is a parallelism on how both theorists look at the State.

In *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* Durkheim has this view of the State.

The State, we said, is the organ of social thought. That does not mean that all social thought springs from the State. But there are two kinds. One comes from the collective mass of society and is diffused throughout that mass; it is made up of those sentiments, ideals, beliefs that the society has worked out collectively and with time, and that are strewn in the consciousness of each one. The other is worked out in the special organ called the state or government. The two are closely related (Durkheim 1950:79).

In the passage above, Durkheim talks about the two components of the state. “The one is diffused, the other has a structure and is centralized. The one, because of this diffusion, stays in the half-light of the sub-conscious” (Durkheim 1950:79). The diffused side is located in the collective mass which includes the individuals and secondary groups their sentiments, many habits, ideals and beliefs that collectively “float about the whole expanse of society” (Durkheim 1950:79) The other component of the state, the structured and centralized, resides in the government or in the coercive apparatus of the state which includes the bureaucracy - the “organ of the government” (Durkheim 1950:79).

Like Durkheim, Gramsci also says the state has two components or parts. “The state in its integral meaning: dictatorship + hegemony” (Gramsci 1971:239). Elaborating on this he writes, “...it should be remarked that the general notion of the state includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense one might say that State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armor of coercion” (Gramsci 1971:262-263). Durkheim’s diffused component of the State is comparable to Gramsci’s civil society/hegemony and Gramsci’s dictatorship/political society is parallel to Durkheim’s centralized/structured component, the government.

Durkheim’s view on the State according to Emirbayer “distinguishes between the administrative and coercive apparatus of society and the State proper” (Emirbayer 1996:114). The administrative

and coercive function of the State for Durkheim is the administration of prohibitive justice as “an organ of moral discipline” (Durkheim 1950:72). In Gramsci’s view this is the political society/dictatorship component of the state.

In Emirbayer’s interpretation, while the principal function of the administrative and coercive apparatus is to act and achieve, that of the State proper “is to elevate the ideals and beliefs of the pre-reflective masses” (1996:114). For Emirbayer, this is what Durkheim means in the following passages of *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*.

State is a special organ whose responsibility it is to work out certain representations which hold good for the collectivity. These representations are distinguished from the other collective representations by their higher degree of consciousness and reflection (Durkheim 1950:50).

Note how similar Durkheim’s words are with that of Gramsci’s on this particular function of the State.

In my opinion, the most reasonable and concrete thing about the ethical state, the cultural state, is this: every state is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development... (Gramsci 1971:258).

On the notion of the state, and its function, it is remarkable that both Durkheim and Gramsci had comparable positions. Both Durkheim and Gramsci recognize that the State has coercive and non-coercive functions. They believe that aside from administrative/coercive function, the state also has cultural function, “as organ of moral discipline” in Durkheim’s words and “raising the cultural and moral level of the population” in Gramsci’s words.

Both Durkheim and Gramsci also have analogous view on the connection between the state, civil society and the individual. They hold that the State utilizes civil society to manufacture consent.

“Durkheim further suggests,” according to Emirbayer “that in the modern age, this State seeks above all to promote the ‘cult of the individual’ within civil society” (1996:114). On the educative and

formative role of the State, Gramsci also made similar assertion. “How will each single individual succeed in incorporating himself into the collective man, and how will educative pressure be applied to single individuals so as to obtain their consent and their collaboration, turning necessity and coercion into ‘freedom’?” (Gramsci 1971:242). Answering his own question, Gramsci says this is in the “domain of civil society” (1971:242). Durkheim and Gramsci are again in accord that the State utilizes civil society to mold people’s thinking and behavior and by doing this, the State generates consent.

Summary

The purpose of this paper is to explore the usefulness of Durkheim’s ideas in understanding Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, particularly its consent component. Durkheim’s ideas can possibly be utilized to enrich and deepen understanding of Gramscian hegemony. Ideas of Durkheim on social solidarity, integration, and rituals can be helpful in explaining the puzzle why workers for example consent to their exploitation. Burawoy said consent is generated through the game of “making-out.” From a Durkheimian perspective by playing the game, workers are integrated into the system that exploits them. Socially integrated, the workers accept the unequal arrangement, find their way through it and maximize their benefits from it by making-out. In the same manner ritual of affirmations in the workplace as mode of action created collective effervescence among workers for the system thus consent to the imbalance set-up. Durkheim point of view on ritual can be helpful to unpack consent.

Another Durkheimian concept that can explain hegemony is collective consciousness or conscience. Shared beliefs and sentiments bind people to society. They function as glue that holds the social order together. Collective consciousness or conscience creates consent for the existing social structure thus making it hegemonic.

Durkheim’s work on civil society which he calls voluntary organization/associations and his analysis of the intermediate domains is helpful not only in understanding civil society but in explaining how they build consent for the state and its projects. It complements Gramsci’s understanding of civil society as trenches and earthworks standing between the state and individuals. Both share the position that

civil society plays important role in integrating the individuals into the collective.

The state is another site where there is uncanny resemblance of Durkheim and Gramsci's views on the state and its functions. It is one pathway where their ideas intersect and in explaining consent generation. The similarities not only supplement Gramsci's notion of the state but valuable in deepening the understanding of the Gramscian position on how consent is generated by the state through its educative function and mobilization of civil society.

Finally, the paper also attempts to demonstrate that sociological positions that are deemed rivals and opposite can also complement each other. While there is divergence in these positions, there can be convergence in them. The convergence will not only bridge the divide between them but can also enrich each position. More explorations on their intersections should be done.

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