

Capitalism and the Future of Schizoids: A Brief Typology

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ABSTRACT

In late capitalism what could be a necessary polarization of libidinal investments for critically understanding social formations arguably no longer demarcates and/or differentiates, hence, depriving subjects of intuitive capacities, of the 'joy of difference'. But what strikes us here is the junction between these capacities for composition starting with intuitive recomposition of pre-individuating intensities into inherent expressions of new images of thought that can counter-effectuate dogmatic images of thought (state-philosophy, for instance, but also dominant moral opinions) and the realm of the preconscious (that is, of class interests which precede individuations of subjects and their emergence into subject-groups); the junction being, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, the machinist processes upon which social formations are built as negotiated fields of libidinal investments. It is here that the proper goal of schizoanalysis is to map out the lines of flight where deterritorializations of flows tend to obscure the critical awareness of the social nature of desiring production.

Keywords: *accelerationism, desiring-production, deterritorialization, libidinal investment, schizoanalysis*

INTRODUCTION

A way to frame *Anti-Oedipus* (Deleuze and Guattari 1983) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) is to cast this kind of collaborative project as a two-pronged critique of the logic of historical necessity as it manifests itself in various forms of social, political, but also, libidinal expressions since the earliest forms of 'capital accumulation' (Marx 1976: 873-876). This theory of accumulation defining the historical origin of the division of labor and the class struggles it generates has since the publication of Marx's *Das Kapital* been outsourced to define the political strategies and tactics of the most advanced section of the oppressed class in challenging the historical determinism of capital. But it also wields a troublesome history

of theoretical deviations, characterizing Marxism after Marx, as it were, and well beyond the “collapse of Marxism” that spawned various types of post-Marxisms (Sim 2000: 1).

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s two-volume critique, in a word, challenged a kind of epistemic privileging specific to counter-hegemonic projects not only by critically re-examining, among others, the theory of capital accumulation, but also by mapping out the overlapping lineaments of macro and micro libidinal investments as they manifest in the social body tailored to function as a machinist assemblage or desiring production. The second aspect deals with desire whose function as a libidinal foil to macro-analyses is ignored with detrimental results for critical theory. This does not mean that psychology is placed among the true important sciences; rather, a more sophisticated critique of desire would come to unmask the limitations of mental and behavioral disciplines, especially as to the critical importance of the unconscious, but also of psychoanalysis, one of the main targets of *Anti-Oedipus*. As Deleuze and Guattari would elaborate their libidinal concept of body as a body without organs, “in reality the unconscious belongs in the realm of physics; the body without organs and its intensities are not metaphors, but matter itself” (1983:23).

A more general description would cast *Anti-Oedipus*, the first volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, as a critique of psychoanalysis and Marxism, two of the most representative forms of critical resistance that end up equivocating their relation to power. The second volume, *A Thousand Plateaus*, renews this assault by exposing the epistemic and ontological justification that oversimplifies microlibidinal investments as they morph into revolutions, civil unrests, and so on. Hence, there is a warning against tendencies to overflow the plane of immanence, or the delicate consistency of life and its constitutive expressions in the social body (1987: 161). At the center of *A Thousand Plateaus* is the principle of multiplicity, enabled by a rhizomatic theory of knowledge that challenges the epistemic status of a secure subject, the operative principle, for instance, behind the idea of the state or the sovereign. But crucial in this project, above all, is the function of philosophy as the virtual intersectional line of this two-volume assault. (It is within this context that Deleuze and Guattari’s last collaboration would culminate in the aptly titled, *What is Philosophy?* Given that, in as early as *A Thousand Plateaus* state-philosophy came as a permanent target:

Ever since philosophy assigned itself the role of ground it has been giving the established powers its blessings, and tracing (*décalquer*) its doctrine of faculties onto the organs of state Power. Common

sense, the unity of all the faculties at the center constituted by the Cogito, is the state consensus raised to the absolute. This was most notably the great operation of the Kantian 'critique,' renewed and developed by Hegelianism (1987:376).

This significantly echoes Marx's formulation of the poverty of philosophy, his critique of the flawed economism of Proudhon as *The System of Economic Contradictions, or The Philosophy of Poverty* that draws upon early anarchistic approaches to the emancipation of the oppressed class (Marx 1976). Proudhon's mistake lies in reducing labor emancipation to collective economic action of the working class premised on equal exchanges of labor produce (effectively transforming socialism into abstract capitalism), even as it abstained from direct political action against the state. In the following, Marx offered one of his most trenchant criticisms of Proudhon's misguided concept of socialism:

Political economy starts from labor as the real soul of production; yet to labor it gives nothing, and to private property everything. From this contradiction Proudhon has concluded in favor of labor and against private property. We understand, however, that this apparent contradiction is the contradiction of estranged labor with itself, and that political economy has merely formulated the laws of estranged labor (Marx 1978: 79).

Proudhon ignored the fact that the state could re-channel resistance to economic policies into unconscious libidinal concessions, the state as the regulator of passions that can be replicated in consciousness as rectified abstractions of reality, as false consciousness in the good old Marxist sense. In this light, Deleuze and Guattari's depiction of state-philosophy acknowledge (with Marx) the presence of the state as the very junction of this (false) consciousness, more correctly framed as libidinal preconscious investments, those the state overcodes by resorting to linguistic euphemisms (1983: 196). There, the state acts as a symbolic machine that overcodes an overlapping network of signs corresponding to preconscious libidinal investments. As a consciousness in the symbolic sense, the state tends toward concretization through which the abstract is realized by inventing codes which undergo two mutual transformations: 1) the *internalization* (of the codes) as a mechanism by means of which it regulates an "increasingly decoded social forces forming a physical system," where decoding represents whatever escapes the regulating arm of the state, and 2) the attendant form of *spiritualization* in a kind of "supraterrestrial field that increasingly overcodes, forming a metaphysical system" (1983: 221).

The latter corresponds in Marxism to false consciousness. But also, as a machine, no less a 'produced' entity in any given system of production that requires, at the very least, a functional principle, the state is likewise "determined by the social system into which it is incorporated in the exercise of its functions" (221). Finally, this "tendency to concretization in the social or technical machine" reveals "the movement of desire" in the state itself:

Again and again we come upon a monstrous paradox; the State is desire that passes from the head of the despot to the hearts of his subjects, and from the intellectual law to the entire physical system that disengages or liberates itself from the law. The State desire, the most fantastic machine for repression, is still desire – the subject that desires and object of desire (221).

As Marx in his time understood the terms of contestation, resistance to State proceeds by political inversion of spiritual codes as in reality invented codes whereby false consciousness is unmasked. It is in this light that Deleuze and Guattari argue that in 'retrospect' we can agree with Marx that 'all desiring production' can be understood "in light of capitalism," provided that "the rules formulated by Marx were followed exactly" (1983:140).

The State as the Foil for Desire

In terms of understanding the libidinal dynamics of revolution whence all states originate, Deleuze and Guattari were careful to extend to psychoanalysis the task of figuring out how, for instance, "preconscious investment bears upon new aims [and] new social syntheses (1983:347). This cautious extension of psychoanalysis allows them to declare, albeit, in terms of reformulating the theory of libidinal investments beyond the terms of psychoanalysis, that "the general principle of schizoanalysis is that desire is always constitutive of a social field" (348). The social field, meanwhile, is always characterized by manifest or overt terms of contestation and containment. As such, desire is either "enslaved to a structured molar aggregate" (the state as an immediate model, but also dominant moral opinions, etc.), or it is the case of "the larger aggregate [subjugated] to the functional multiplicities that it itself forms on a molecular scale" (348).

In this light, *Anti-Oedipus* identifies two poles of social libidinal investment in regard to the modern history of the state: 1) "the paranoid, reactionary, fascisizing pole," and, 2) "the schizoid revolutionary pole"

(366). These poles intersect, as it were, in the state, or the sovereign. As Deleuze and Guattari emphasize, “Unconscious paranoiac investment ... must always hide under assignable aims and interests presented as the general aims and interests, even though in reality the latter represents only the members of the dominant class or the fraction of this class” (367). As to the role of the schizoid revolutionary pole in relation to the sovereign, its nature is simply to pursue a line of escape. But lines of escape do not arise out of a vacuum. As Deleuze and Guattari argue:

But the other pole, the schizophrenic escape itself does not merely consist in withdrawing from the social, in living on the fringe: it causes the social to take flight through the multiplicity of holes that eat away at it and penetrate it, always coupled directly to it, everywhere setting the molecular charges that will explode what must explode, make fall what must fall, make escape what must escape, at each point ensuring the conversion of schizophrenia as a process into an effectively revolutionary force (341).

In this respect, Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge the existence of class interests that shape revolutionary actions, provided that they serve as preconscious interests in so far as they precede the individuations of subjects and their emergence into subject-groups. Meanwhile, one way to interpret a revolutionary upsurge from preconscious class interests is via the celebrated inversion of Hegel for which Marx gained a notorious appeal. Hegel, notwithstanding, was a far more comprehensive thinker than his predecessor (Kant) in terms of the inherent conundrums of metaphysical systems that state codes internalized as concrete realities. In light of his concept of freedom (Kant 2007:463), Kant would have absorbed these coded realities as necessary, thereby, allowing the state to force a consensus of internalized realities coded to such an extent that the physical systems like the structures of civil society, family, and so on are secured from over-spiritualization (which can lead to dogmatic and sceptic modes of thought) beyond the practical, ethical and moral interests of the human order. In Kant, the state enjoyed the status of an independent legislating figure above class interests, as if the state is not itself also legislated upon by class interests. Given that, however, the revolutionary unmasking of false social codes, vis-à-vis Hegel, is achieved beyond the ethical in so far as false consciousness actually operates in the realm of desiring production. This approximates Hegel’s concept of desire except that desire in its delirious state must find a rational culmination; hence, the proverbial ‘for-itself’ consciousness of self-aware desire. As Hegel puts it, “this antithesis

of [appearance]and [truth] has, however, for its essence only the truth, viz., the unity of self-consciousness with itself," in such a way that "this unity must become essential to self-consciousness, i.e., self-consciousness is *Desire* in general" (1977: 105). But in as much as the philosopher is tasked to complete this unity in self-consciousness, it is important to return to Marx's critique of Hegel.

Taking Althusser's lead in this respect, one can situate this problematic within the so-called epistemological break, from the philosophically minded Marx of his younger years, though already seceding from Hegel, to the late Marx as the economic thinker of social ownership of production who renounced philosophy in favor of a post-philosophical vision of the future without class. For the late Marx, philosophy had no intention to overcome the preconscious, the purely subjective realm of consciousness. In the Marx of Althusser, the future of philosophy is politics. Politics is the becoming future of the preconscious into a functional principle, the realization of the actual, yet compressed content of reason, in terms of how desiring to produce a future via conscious politics, that is, as an act overtaking subjective reflection, can advance rather expediently from its self-confinement in negativity (Althusser 2005). The future of philosophy, is therefore, an active preconscious-negating force of escape. In Deleuzian terms, nonetheless, the Marxist becoming of a future-without-class, however, must not stipulate an end or finality in light of the nature of becoming as unfixed delirium, as desire (Deleuze and Guattari 1983:366). In a word, communism is not a state of affairs, but as a real movement, its own necessity, an end in itself (Marx and Engels 1998: 57).

The black humor of Capital

Arguably, however, the history of capital accumulation has come to a point at which any attempt to subvert the present that is supposed to actualize communism seems already far-fetched. It has evolved into a state in which the efficiency and speed, for instance, with which capital mimics labor,¹ where labor is reduced to unreal productivity even as it continues to produce under the logic of real subsumption,² proves that capital itself is the inverted fantastic realism of its opposite. In *Grundrisse*, Marx originally formulated this theory of subsumption as follows:

In the shallowest conception, distribution appears as the distribution of products, and hence, as further removed from or quasi-independent of production. But before distribution can be

distribution of products, it is: 1) the distribution of the instruments of production, and 2) which is a further specification of the same relation, the distribution of the members of the society among the different kinds of production. (Subsumption of the individuals under specific relations of production). The distribution of products is only a result of this distribution, which is comprised within the process of production itself and determines the structure of production (1978: 233).

For Marx, the goal of labor production is to emancipate itself from historical necessity in the sense of the realization of necessity in the freest terms possible, as the unbounded expressionism of desire, or the Hegelian unity of desire and reason whose closest formulation in Marx is the concept of the 'general intellect' (1978: 285). But instead of labor as the immanent expression of pre-individuating intensities emancipating from the necessity that binds it to an exploitative relation, such as the extraction of labor-time to produce unpaid surpluses, capital frees itself from contingency (from the impalpability of the pre-conscious, so to speak.) Capital accomplishes this by deterritorializing the pre-conscious in which labor is endlessly overcoded into a stimulus to create (Singleton 2014: 489-507), through a process of real abstraction that is as much theoretical as it is real and concrete, itself capable of producing a social ontology. As Alfred Sohn-Rethel offers an objective description, real abstraction is itself "capable of producing socially valid results" (Sohn-Rethel 1978:77). In the same light, Deleuze and Guattari describe this paradox as follows:

Marx's black humor, the source of *Capital*, is his fascination with such a machine [the capitalist machine]: how it came to be assembled, on what foundation of decoding and deterritorialization; how it works, always more decoded, always more deterritorialized; how its operation grows more relentless with the development of the axiomatic, the combination of the flows [how] it does not run the risk of dying all alone (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 373).

In this sense, capitalism has become "the schizoid time of the new creative break" (223). The creative break constitutes the schizoid character of capitalist transformation from the old desiring-machines of production, for instance, of the old despotic or feudal regimes lacking the full deterritorializing intensity of the schizoid. In the advent of capitalism, the schizophrenic escape has become the official form of creation, of desiring production whose equivalent in Marx is the real abstraction of capitalist commodity (Sohn-Rethel 1978: 28). Deleuze and Guattari recognize Marx's

concept of the identical nature of commodity with labor, not only in view of their common social substance (Marx 1976: 138-39), but also, and indeed, of the fact that commodities as do societies rectify: “Marx clearly demonstrated the importance of the problem: the ever widening circle of capitalism is completed, while reproducing its immanent limits on an ever larger scale, only if the surplus value is not only produced or extorted but absorbed or realized” (234). Here, the absorption and realization of surplus value is perverse enough – labor is made to consume a part of the unpaid surplus it produced at the same time that it is realized as a social affair, a productive affair even as it grows into new series of creative breaks, producing surpluses that generate consumer goods. Marx’s concept of labor alienation from surplus value is therefore, incomplete without the theory of how flows of desire as they are decoded, decoded by the schizoid in the sense that it abstracts and realizes the surplus, are reterritorialized at the same time by capital that has saturated the social field with entities to abstract or realize, that is, to deterritorialize. In discussing how ‘monetarization’ as the final deterritorializing act of capital has become “a global object of investment of desire,” Deleuze and Guattari argue:

The wage earner’s desire, the capitalist’s desire, everything moves to the rhythm of one and the same desire: *the differential relation of flows having no assignable limit, and where capitalism reproduces its immanent limits on an ever widening and more comprehensive scale.* Hence, it is at the level of a generalized theory of flows that one is able to reply to the question: how does one come to desire strength, while also desiring one’s own impotence? ... And how far does desire go beyond so-called objective interests, when it is a question of flow to set in motion or to break? (239).

As the rate of decoding and deterritorializing in late capitalism has become exponentially high-speed, desire has also become a saturated field of intensities in that something already nonhuman is operating the entire machine of desiring-production. What has been understated in the nonhuman is the pure immanence of life as it expresses itself in sexuality, labor or production. Indeed, it is what capitalism *understates*. Capitalism exploits life but not as much as to negate it. It uses life to exploitative ends to such an extent that life has become a coded metaphysical abstraction – life is a means to an end, whose end is life. It is in this context that the reference to Nietzsche in *Anti-Oedipus* is called for in terms of problematizing an historical notion of reactive nihilism. In Nietzsche, we see for the first time how desire and unconscious impulses can lead to a kind of reactive

nihilism, or the *becoming-reactive* of man in the person of the moralist and the economist transforming life into a huge support mechanism that is made to underwrite a “monetary system” (Seem 1983: xviii), as exploitative as capitalism. Nietzsche ‘pointed a way out’ and beyond the system, “whereas Marx and Freud were too ingrained” (xviii-xix) in the system they were challenging, short of a maximum potential for co-optation.

Both psychoanalysis and Marxism, notwithstanding, set out to challenge the cultural and historical makings of capital though settled with misleading approaches to capital accumulation. On the one hand, psychoanalysis has become a “gigantic enterprise of absorption of surplus value,” even as it reterritorializes the schizoid into an “ideology of lack” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 239; 295). Psychoanalysis cushions the impact of the pathologies of lack in the form of enjoying the symptoms of lack, hence, the necessity of commodities as symptoms of unrealized surplus value. But the social itself is engendered not by lack, rather by production. As Deleuze and Guattari comment, “the creation of lack as a function of market economy is the creation of a dominant class” (28).

On the other hand, as to the fascist solution applied by Marxist regimes, abandoning the world market was a far worse alternative than embracing capitalism, as the experiments of Maoist China, as well as the War Communism of ‘all power to the Soviets’ up to end of the Cold War had shown, not without catastrophic consequences on political and social freedom (239). If these regimes ended up as capitalists, the fascist solution devolved into a paranoid state, all the more as liberal freedom, or a minimum application of it, became the unwanted compromise with the rule of capital.

The Paradox of Schizoid Becoming

At present, a new alternative is sought out in Nietzsche’s concept of the death of God, which says that “what is important is not the news that God is dead, but the time this news takes to bear fruit” (106). Here, the death of God is made to represent the idealized death of capitalism, once an emancipatory system that overthrew the despotism of feudal regimes. But the time to wait for the death of God to bear fruit, the death of what turned out to be a more exploitative system, is the opportune time for the schizoid to “accelerate the process”(240). That is, to accelerate the schizophrenic escape.

This has become the battle cry, for instance, of the techno-scientific left, the neo-rationalist left introduced by the *Manifesto for Accelerationist Politics* (Williams and Srnicek in Mackay and Avanesian 2014: 347-362). As Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek put it in their recent collaboration after the phenomenal *Manifesto for Accelerationist Politics*, 21st century left must “expand [its] collective imagination beyond what capitalism allows.” As they argue:

Rather than settling for marginal improvements in battery and computer power, the left should mobilize dreams of decarbonizing the economy, space travel, robot economies – all the traditional touchstones of science fiction – in order to prepare for a day beyond capitalism. Neoliberalism, as secure as it may seem today, contains no guarantee of future survival.... Our task is to invent what happens next (Williams and Srnicek 2015: 183).

Interesting in this push to accelerate (presumably, more acceleration unleashes the real productive intensity of the schizoid; in contrast, capitalism does not want to fully accelerate) is the aspect where desiring-machines eventually pursue schizophrenic escape for its own sake. Here, the Deleuzean theory of flows, of decoded flows in late capitalism bears its mark in the question, where does deterritorialization end? In his critique of left accelerationism, Franciso ‘Bifo’ Berardi importantly asserts, for instance, that the optimistic standpoint of accelerationism as to repurposing capital to real emancipatory ends in terms of the progressive acceleration of techno-scientific knowledge comes at the cost of ignoring the dual nature of the schizoid:

[The] schizoid is the accelerating pace of the Unconscious. Schizophrenia is all about speed: the speed of the surrounding universe in relation to the speed of mental interpretation. Yet there is no dimension of normalcy to restore ... [Schizophrenia] is both the metaphor of capitalism and the methodology of revolutionary action (Berardi 2013: n.p.).

Translated into a techno-political theory, the accelerationist call for full automation and universal basic income (UBI) is designed to achieve Marx’s prophecy of the emancipation of labor from the rule of capital. But for Berardi, this already assumes that “capitalism is intrinsically ordained to culminate in communism” (n.p.). In the same orientation, Berardi levels his criticism at Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s once widely popular *Empire* (Hardt and Negri 2000) which states that the immediate potential

for the actualization of Marx's notion of the general intellect resides in today's internet technologies. But information technology was already embedded in the financial structures and surveillance mechanisms of deep state, reducing labor time to sign-values and simulations (Gardner 2017: 53), and life to biopolitical controls, respectively, before it became a surplus to abstract and realize in the realm of culture (Fisher 2009: 6). In short, the potentials for emancipation, though embedded in capitalism, do not intrinsically translate into the necessity to actualize them.

Unlike the accelerationists, Berardi does not envision autonomy from capital as an ontological necessity. Also, unlike Nick Land whose notorious adaptation of accelerationism initiated the awareness of critical theory as to the full techno-industrial capacity of the schizoid, in terms of radicalizing the machinic nature of intensive becoming in a post-human future, Berardi would envision autonomy rather as an act of sustaining "the infinity of the present" by "[abandoning] the illusion of the future" (n.p.). For Land, the schizoid can only thrive under capitalism, such that the emancipatory potential of schizophrenia can only mean the full embrace of the inhuman; first in the machinist processes of what Land describes as the "technomic time" of present-day "commercial industrialism" (Land in Mackay and Avanesian 2014: 511), and finally, in the reduction of the human to the machinist impersonalism of life, already being pushed to extremes by the rhizomatic acceleration of capital.

For Berardi, "Far from being the methodology of liberation, rhizomatics should be viewed as a methodology of the permanent deterritorialization of global financial capitalism" (n.p.). In contrast, Berardi offers the methodology of autonomy which, as he describes, relies upon the restoration of mind and body that has been separated by the 'technomic time' of capitalism (preferring the mind becoming invisible body-nature through the hyperrealism of information and smart technologies and financial algorithms). It is in this sense that the time of capitalism is an extension of the modernist project that ushered in the Cartesian dualism of subject and object.

Schizoidal Marxism?

Deleuze's and Guattari's purposive return to Marx is, therefore, important in light of the current impasse in anti-capitalist movement which stems from the dual nature of capitalism itself: 1) capitalism thrives on producing for its own sake, "continually surpassing its limits," even as

it capitalizes on the schizophrenic impulse of constant deterritorialization but at the same time, 2) reterritorializes the schizophrenic in terms of reproducing itself within determinate limits, the limits being the immanence of flows on various planes of composition, "local, world-wide, or planetary" (1983: 259). This double-movement of capitalism has its historical source in the early decoding and deterritorialization of nascent capitalism, in merchant capitalism where flows were initially orienting toward a new power, the power of capital, vis-à-vis the despotic machine (*Urstaat*) of the pre-capitalist state. It is important to underline here that the state oversees the flows in any given system of distribution of intensities. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, the state acquires its modern function in capitalism as that which gives capitalism "its model of realization" (1987: 434). The state was originally the overseer of desiring-production, neutralizer of poles of social libidinal investments, but in the advent of late capitalism it dissolves in "an independent, worldwide axiomatic, like that of a single City, megalopolis, 'megamachine' of which States are parts or neighbourhoods" (434-35).

Today the relation of Capital and State becomes less ambivalent; quite the opposite of mechanized capitalism of mass production and standardized consumption of low-cost commodities in pre-war economic period that saw to the rise of Fordist economic and social organization models. Under this dispensation, the state mimicked capital's method of social organization. But in today's unequivocal relation between capital and state, the lines of separation dissolve so that the real equivocation of their positions is concealed. The mantra of the independence of markets in Fordist capitalism, for instance, is overshadowed by post-Fordist neoliberal equivocation of the roles of markets and states.³ The independence of markets is also the independence of capital from labor now reduced to flexible production (Mansfield 1992:1-16), a far cry from the socialized and centralized character of labor in industrial assembly lines. It turned everyone into a consumer or provider of services: the laborer into a consumer of goods that come to him through virtual networks of providers, retail and advertising chains, and so on, which altogether undermine his claim to the products he helped produce, which is a more complex and sophisticated condition of labour alienation than detailed by Marx. Along this development, the political structure of society also drastically changes: societies modelled after the efficiency of production lines in Fordism gave way to control societies in which centralized labor, coupled to mass production and standardized consumption, turns into a decentralized, *self-managing desire* coupled to commodity fetishes.

In control society, both the capitalist and the wage-earner are transformed into a different kind of desiring-machines: on the one hand, the capitalist, liberated from labor, all the more with decentralized production and management hierarchies in which he is structurally invisible, desires his impotence, instead of his sovereign power over work that would place him otherwise in a classical battle of master-slave dialectic; on the other hand, the wage-earner desires the stable reproduction of this impotence through personalized consumptions – personalized as the entire production has been liberated from sociality, which in Marx, had always been identical with labor (Marx 1976: 138-39). In this social apocalypse, both capital and labor are avoiding the final confrontation, so to speak.

Desire, thus, becomes unable to ‘produce’. This does not mean that desiring-production ceases in the literal sense but rather becomes effectively undifferentiated. At this point, what could have been a necessary polarization of libidinal investments crucial in understanding social formations, unfortunately, no longer demarcates or differentiates; in turn, it denies to subjects the capacity for intuition – intuition being “the joy of difference” (Deleuze 2004: 33). But what strikes us here is the junction between these capacities for compositionality, the intuition of difference as an abiding alternative still lacking an audience.

Intuition of Difference

The return to difference would mean a fresh understanding of this *junction*, between the intuitive recomposition of pre-individuating intensities into immanent expressions of images that counter-effectuate state-images, for instance (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 65) and the realm of the preconscious (class interests) that shape revolutionary actions. The junction, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, represents the “machinist processes” upon which social formations are built as negotiated fields of libidinal investments and also upon which ‘modes of production’ depend. These machinist processes are intensive fields of desiring-production: “We define social formations as *machinist processes* and not by modes of production (these on the contrary depend on the processes)” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 435). Here, the proper goal of schizoanalysis is to map out the lines of flight where deterritorializations of flows are assigned to locations that obscure the intersectional planes of molar (large aggregates of social forces impinging on the libidinal economy) and the molecular (multiplicities being made to form chains or significations as normal social continuum by molar aggregates, but are also capable of draining the social

by discovering holes to escape from). The equivalent of this mapping in Marx is to identify the ideological lines separating preconscious interests from their representational claims, whether they endorse or negate revolutionary change.

If we will recall, Marx's description of ideology as *camera obscura* whose clearest intent on the side of the state is the negation of the preconscious. By a process of real abstraction, everything is already realized, abstractly, in the sense of active enjoyment of the real through the intercession of commodities. Marx wanted to set the order back to the ideological level, the preconscious class interest where reality is abstracted on the level of consumption (what he ignored are the unconscious libidinal investments with disastrous consequences for Marxism). But if ideology in late capitalism is also deprived of intentional capacity for correcting the images obscured by state ideology as a result of the double-movement of deterritorialization and decoding, then ideology itself loses its residual counter-effectuating intensities on the level of the preconscious. The end of ideology is the erasure of the preconscious, the demolition of class interest; hence, the closure of any potential for schizoid to morph. In other words, it is not a question of ideology. As Deleuze and Guattari elaborate their position:

That is why when subjects, individuals, or groups act manifestly counter to their class interests – when they rally to the interests and ideals of a class that their own objective situation should lead them to combat – it is not enough to say: they were fooled, the masses have been fooled. It is not an ideological problem, a problem of failing to recognize, or of being subject to, an illusion. It is a problem of desire, and *desire is part of the infrastructure....* [Unconscious] investments are made according to positions of *desire* and uses of synthesis, very different from the subject, individual or collective, who desires. (1983:104)

In this light, *Anti-Oedipus* lays out the three tasks of schizoanalysis as the “analysis [of the] specific nature of [libidinal investments] in [both] the economic and political spheres” (104). But in laying out the three syntheses of schizoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari also in effect put into play the Bergsonian intuition of difference.

The Three Syntheses

In his essay on Bergson (2004), Deleuze argues that in relation to objects that the subject desires, objects ought to be differentiated not only in terms of degrees but also of their intensities. Intuiting *difference of degrees* is supposed to be the achievement of a scientific or analytic mind, whereas, of *intensities*, that of the schizoid embracing a creative form of madness. The intuition of difference of intensities with respect to objects is sought out in order that the consumption of objects ceases to be a matter of representing what the subject itself represents, through the objects that he desires and consumes (therefore, eliminates the symptomatic consumption of objects that psychoanalysis, for instance, is unable to transcend), or where the subject stands as to its knowledge of the world in general, such as reflected in personalized methods of dealing with the world (again 'personalized' as everything is abstracted from the social nature of desire). But rather, of freely enjoying difference "not as a result of a method, but the method itself" (2004:104). Here, the unity of thinking and desiring, thought and experience, otherwise the duality in unity is attained beyond the fixed dualism of subject-object. In psychoanalysis, the subject-object distinction presupposes a lack by means of which, through the abundance of unrealized surplus, the subject is made to enjoy the symptom of such lack; in the end, endorsing a system of cultural inertia in which the subject confuses freedom with personalized consumption.

Deleuze and Guattari likened this negativity to a literary interpretation in which no one can ever 'tease out the unconscious' in it, so to speak, "since the latter is constantly inducing a false image of the thing it represses" and according to which "the unconscious ... merely [represents] what a repressive apparatus gives it to represent" (1983: 339). In other words, to 'schizophrenize' is to dismantle the consistency of social codes, or coded realities regarded as conscious entities, as they accumulate in the unconscious where desire is constituted to such an extent that as coded desire cannot escape.

In other words, the first synthesis performed by schizoanalysis is to employ a *connective synthesis* between the subject and the objects and flows of desire that at the outset are rendered disconnected or unconnected by the social machine of the unconscious, with the purpose of creating a need to close the gap, hence, a false synthesis. The fact is the objects that a subject desires are not the same objects that the social machine gives it to desire – in this context, the connective synthesis occurs in re-establishing the *actual* synthesis of the social apparatus and the objects that the subject

is being led to believe were coming from its own ego or desire. In restoring the actual synthesis between the apparatus of the unconscious and the objects it bestows, their false synthesis is unmasked as in reality merely a coded pre-existing unity.

In so far, however, as the subject is also led to believe that a pre-existing unity is necessary before it can emerge as a desiring-subject, the second synthesis commences to establish this time the real *disjunction* between the subject who desires the objects and the apparatus that bestows them. It is both a disjunction and a synthesis: on the one hand, as a disjunction, the subject and the object bestowed by the apparatus are exposed to be unrelated; on the other hand, as a synthesis, they are made to relate merely as a function of decoding the terms of alienation that, for one, institute a false unity between 1) subject and object, and 2) between subject-object (the false synthesis) and the social apparatus of the unconscious.

It is at this junction where the subject becomes a schiz, described here as the general subject of the unconscious, who knows the difference between “the one who escapes (from the false syntheses of desire and object) and the one who knows how to make what he is escaping escape (that is, into a disjunctive synthesis)” (1983: 341). The third synthesis is the schiz who freely desires and produces – a desiring-production in itself; one who enjoys the objects of his own desire. Thus, for subjects to actually become schizoids, they must be able to confront the ‘unconscious conditions’ for ‘autocritique’ (1983: 271) which is best attained through the intuition of difference. As the issue stands, and to conclude this paper, the push to accelerate to post-capitalism depends on the actual praxis of schizoids engaged in self-critiques.

But this also means that the schizoid must be constantly recharged, at the same time that it prevents the collapse of capital. Seemingly, capital is imperishable as long as life guarantees schizoids.

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ENDNOTES

¹ "[Capitalist] power, in the age of complexity, is not based on slow, rational, conscious decisions, but on embedded automatisms which do not move at the speed of the human brain. Rather, they move at the speed of the catastrophic process itself" (Berardi 2013). Similarly, in his own theory of speed, Paul Virilio (1977) expands on Deleuze and Guattari's concept of deterritorialization of space, which translates into "the arrival of speed or chronopolitics" (Armitage 2000).

² Antonio Negri has devoted an analysis of this theory in light of late capitalist form of accumulation, which extends Marx's observations to current economic and political conditions, at the same time drawing from it a theory of autonomy which picks up an important process occurring in capitalism itself, namely, as he describes, "the passage between surplus value theory and circulation theory" in which a specific kind of subject is formed, that which "becomes ever more real, ever more concrete" in that "the cellular structure described by the surplus value theory becomes body, finished animal reality" (Negri1991:107).

³ Though Gramsci did not live to witness the effects of post-Fordism, his trenchant analysis of Fordist economy where he anticipated the rise of neoliberalism beyond the Fordist model is a standard read on the relation of the movement of capital and the larger social organization, (Gramsci 1992: 277-320).