

# Deleuze's *Nietzsche*: Life, Critique, and Difference

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## Abstract

In this article, I re-visit and navigate Nietzsche's concepts of genealogy, will to power, and the eternal return through the lens of Gilles Deleuze's philosophy. Nietzschean philosophy occupies a significant part in the preliminary blueprints of Deleuze's philosophy of difference, which relatively encompasses even his collaborative scholarship with Guattari. Hence, this research likewise diagrams some critical affinities between Nietzsche and Deleuze, in conjunction with other contemporary thinkers and issues. My disquisition of the aphorism as a philosophical style and genealogy grounds my engagement with the principles of will to power and the eternal return. Through the evaluative aptitude of the will to power and the differential and ethical powers of the eternal return, genealogy transforms into a philosophical device of critique, diagnosis, and creation. Genealogy criticizes and undermines all dogmatic images of thought; it diagnoses values, forces, and relations; and, it engenders new modes of thinking and living, or what Deleuze and Guattari would later call the world-to-come.

**Keywords:** becoming, difference, eternal return genealogy, and the will to power

## INTRODUCTION

The early stages of Deleuze's academic years at Sorbonne in the mid-1940s is characterized by seismic tension with the dogmatic regime of the history of philosophy dominated by Hegelianism, Marxism, and Phenomenology.<sup>1</sup> His philosophy serves as an unambiguous mouthpiece

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<sup>1</sup> See Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnett, *Dialogues II*, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: Athlone Press, 1987), 18.



to the French people's communal frustration with the aforesaid traditions, especially Hegelianism.<sup>2</sup> The Hegelian philosophy's logic of negation and contradiction, Ronald Bogue asserts, is based on the philosophy of identity "within which the non-rational *other* could be only conceived of as the shadow of the rational *same*."<sup>3</sup> Against the prevalent dissonance and turmoil engulfing the French society during Deleuze's time, what is clamored is a philosophy of difference irreducible to the logic of identity.<sup>4</sup> Such a project is realizable through Nietzschean philosophy according to Deleuze.

The Deleuze-Nietzsche encounter forefronts one of the most provocative re-configurations of Nietzsche's philosophy in contemporary French philosophy. In Deleuze's philosophy, Nietzsche is portrayed as a systematic philosopher whose radical project is massively informed by a comprehensive critique of Platonic, Hegelian, and Kantian transcendental philosophies. To be specific, it is vitally inspired by Nietzsche's overturning of Platonism toward an ontology of becoming; a replacement of the Hegelian negation of negation with an affirmative philosophy of life; and a completion of Kant's critical philosophy against the backdrop of conventional Western rational scholarship.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone Press, 1983), 195. However, Deleuze's relation with Hegel remains enigmatic, say for example in *Difference and Repetition*. trans. by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

<sup>3</sup> Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari* (London: Routledge, 1989), 2.

<sup>4</sup> The May 1968 Student Protest is one the clearest event that goes beyond the logic of identity. For Deleuze and Guattari, "(T)he people ... understood nothing of the event because something unaccountable was escaping. The politicians, the parties, the unions, many leftists, were utterly vexed; they kept repeating over and over again that 'conditions were not ripe. It was as though they had been temporarily deprived of the entire dualism machine that made them valid spokespeople.... A molecular flow was escaping, minuscule at first, then swelling, without, however, ceasing to be unassignable" [Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 216].

<sup>5</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 195.

In Nietzsche, philosophy assumes a self-reflexive stance and its quintessential epistemological hubris is underscored.<sup>6</sup> Since this revolutionary feat disengages us from a world of unity, essence, and teleology, mankind is emancipated from the shackles of dogmatism or transcendentalism. Hence, the human condition is given an opportunity to create new values and carve new pathways of living. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, this moment of child-like innocence<sup>7</sup> entails humanity's liberation from its psychological bondage or slavish relation to a transcendental reality towards a secular world characterized by change, chaos, and chance. Deleuze describes this event in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* as the radical transition from the old to the new image of thought—the Overman. As a new image of thought, the tragic serves as the Overman's differential ground. Echoing Deleuze, “The tragic is not to be found in this anguish or disgust, nor in a nostalgia for lost unity. The tragic is only to be found in multiplicity, in the diversity of affirmation as such. Hence, what defines the tragic is the joy of multiplicity, plural joy.”<sup>8</sup>

### **Genealogy as Critique and the New Image of Thought**

Deleuze's reconstruction of Nietzsche exhibits a creative struggle with Nietzsche or what Paolo Bolaños describes as an experimentation and radicalization of our thinking and language.<sup>9</sup> Like his reconstruction of Spinoza's 'expressionism,'<sup>10</sup> Deleuze's appropriation of Nietzsche endorses a minoritarian reading of the text and the world a kind of interpretation and understanding without reference to any pre-conceived essence and *telos*. As a result, everything

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<sup>6</sup> See Hugh Tomlison, “Nietzsche on the Edge of Town: Deleuze and Reflexivity,” in *Exceedingly Nietzsche: Aspects of Contemporary Nietzsche-Interpretation* (London: Routledge, 1988).

<sup>7</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book For Everyone and No One*, trans. with an introduction by R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1969), 27.

<sup>8</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 17.

<sup>9</sup> See Paolo Bolaños, *On Affirmation and Becoming: A Deleuzian Introduction to Nietzsche's Ethics and Ontology* (United Kingdom, New Castle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 2. Bolaños' book provides us with a comprehensive introduction of Nietzschean philosophy using Deleuzian philosophy.

<sup>10</sup> See Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, trans. by Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books), 1992.

becomes fragmentary, dynamic, and relational. It is in this regard that I agree with Jacques Derrida's remark that in attempting to make sense of Nietzsche's writings, one becomes powerless because he or she is offered a polemical world of aphorisms devoid of any logical lucidity.<sup>11</sup>

An aphorism, Deleuze writes, is "a play of forces ... the latest, the newest ... Nietzsche puts this very clearly: if you want to know what I mean, then find the force that gives a new sense to what I say and hang the text upon it."<sup>12</sup> An aphoristic style and interpretation open humanity to a world of chance and possibilities. The purpose of Nietzsche's aphoristic style of writing or philosophizing is to disturb the readers from their essentialist slumbers by antagonizing the hierarchical and regimented style of traditional philosophical writing and thinking dominating the Western philosophy. Furthermore, aphorism, as a philosophical style, is immensely influential in the works of continental philosophers. For example, Theodor Adorno's theorization of the essay in "The Essay as Form,"<sup>13</sup> lucidly illustrates the subversive power of the aphorism. Albeit primarily conceived as a critique of scientific positivism and traditional philosophy, Adorno's essay enunciates a self-reflexive style that "negates anything systematic"<sup>14</sup> which is differentially receptive to the non-identical.

Moreover, Nietzsche's aphoristic philosophy is shaped by a radical critique of nihilism—European modernity's sickness. This means that his philosophical style is both a critical appraisal of European scholarship's blind obsession with identity and its underlying cultural malady. The heart of this decadent culture is the Judaeo-Christian tradition or Christian morality—the bastion of the ascetic ideal and *ressentiment*.

The demarcation line between Deleuze and other commentators is his typological reading of nihilism. This distinct appropriation is significantly inspired by Nietzsche's principle of genealogy. Deleuze

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<sup>11</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Spurs: Nietzsche's Style*, trans. by Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 127; cf. Bolanos, *On Affirmation and Becoming*, 1.

<sup>12</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 145.

<sup>13</sup> Theodor Adorno, "Essay as Form," trans. by Bob Hullot-Kentor and Frederic Will, *New German Critique*, 32 (Spring–Summer 1984), 151–171.

<sup>14</sup> Adorno, "Essay as Form," 165.

claims that even though there is a latent Kantian legacy in Nietzsche's scholarship, the latter courageously exposes Kant's so-called bad faith, i.e., in preventing the values of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty from critical diagnosis: "One of the principal motifs of Nietzsche's work is that Kant had not carried out a true critique because he was not able to pose the problem of critique in terms of values. And what has happened in modern philosophy is that the theory of values has given rise to a new conformism and new forms of submission."<sup>15</sup> Deleuze explains that the Kantian immanent critique simply concludes that critique is a "critique of reason by reason itself."<sup>16</sup> This project is apparently dogged by contradiction by making reason the judge and the accused at the same time. Consequently, Kant fails to formulate a philosophical device that would subject reason to immanent critique. Unfortunately, this blunder serves as a microcosm of transcendental philosophy's blindness in creating conditions that remain external to the conditioned.

The aforesaid Kantian shortcoming provokes Nietzsche to introduce the question of value into thought. The conceptualization of a philosophy of values conditions the emergence of a genuine critique necessary for the conceptualization of a genealogical philosophy that further criticizes the value of values. As such, the locus of a Nietzschean genealogy is to assess whether values differentially originate from noble and base or ascending and descending typologies. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze elucidates:

Genealogy means both the value of origin and the origin of values. Genealogy is opposed to absolute values as it is to relative or utilitarian ones. Genealogy signifies the differential element of values from which their value itself derives. Genealogy thus means origin or birth, but also difference ... in the origin. Genealogy means nobility and baseness, nobility and vulgarity, nobility, and decadence in the origin.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 1.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 91.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

Difference lies at the heart of the origin of values, which can be both affirmative and negative. The affirmative aspect of genealogy belongs to the regime of the master. The master affirms himself or herself as good and perceives the slave as bad. This is tantamount to an affirmation of difference—a *pathos of distance* from the slave. The noble mode of evaluation, Nietzsche accentuates, “acts and grows spontaneously, it seeks its opposite only so as to affirm itself more gratefully and triumphantly—its negative concept ‘low,’ ‘common,’ ‘bad’ is only a subsequently-invented pale, contrasting image in relation to its positive basic concept—filled with life and passion through and through—‘we noble ones, we good, beautiful, happy ones.’”<sup>18</sup>

On the other hand, the negative serves as the slave’s territory. The slave abhors difference; instead of affirming his or her difference from the master, he or she resents the master and recognizes him or her as evil: “While every noble morality develop from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says *No* to what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’ what is “not itself’ ... This inversion ... is ... the essence of *ressentiment*.”<sup>19</sup> The slave’s *ressentiment* to the master is a parasitic reaction or negative evaluation that further serves as the foundation of his or her degenerate sense of affirmation.<sup>20</sup> His or her inchoate and blind understanding of nobility leads to the specious conclusion that the master craves for power and recognition in the slave.<sup>21</sup>

Additionally, the slave abominates his or her body and clings to the belief of the ‘afterworld’ to escape life’s absurdity. It is an apparent

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<sup>18</sup> See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), 260; cf. Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. by Walter Kaufmann, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche* (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 37; Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 119.

<sup>19</sup> Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 36.

<sup>20</sup> See *ibid.*, 121, 139. The slave is a “covert Hegelian whose thought... proceeds via contradiction and negation, and only arrives at affirmation through a ‘negation of the negation’” (Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari*, 17).

<sup>21</sup> In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche perfectly describes the slave’s decadence: “‘How poor man is after all,’ he thought in his heart; ‘how ugly, how wheezing, how full of hidden shame!’ ... This fellow too loved himself, even as he despised himself: a great lover he seems to me, and a great despiser. None have I found yet who despised himself more deeply: that too is a kind of height!” (Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 267).

demonstration of nihilistic will or reactive life. On the contrary, the master despises any reactive confirmation from something external to him or her. Not that he or she resembles the myopic Cartesian subject, but he or she merely affirms his or her ascending power and difference from the slave—a double affirmation of oneself, not a double negation of difference. Furthermore, the master audaciously embraces life's incongruities and hammers dogmatic regimes of thought dominantly appropriated by rationalism.<sup>22</sup> Because Nietzsche's genealogy territorializes reason, it opens for the possibility of real difference to exist and more importantly, for radically new pathways of life affirmation to be created—a kind of thinking that entails “discovering, inventing, new possibilities of life.”<sup>23</sup>

For Nietzsche, the genealogical critique is an active form of evaluation and expression of a mode of existence. In other words, genealogy's aptitude of evaluation presupposes its power of creation. It cannot be classified under the category of reaction because this activity is not fueled by revenge or slave morality.<sup>24</sup> Not only is the question of value the concern of Nietzsche's critique, but also of sense. In this regard, comprehending the sense of something (anthropological, psychological, political, or biological) necessitates the identification of the force responsible for appropriating, exploiting, possessing, and expressing it.<sup>25</sup> Genealogy is no longer preoccupied with the conventional distinction between appearance and essence. Rather, it is concerned with the perception of phenomenon as a symptom of existing forces, which refers to “the succession of forces which take possession of it”<sup>26</sup> and the “forces which struggle for possession.”<sup>27</sup> If

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<sup>22</sup> See Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 101. This critique parallels to Adorno's promotion of the primacy of object rather than of concepts. Of course, this diagnosis is informed by his revaluation of the Cartesian and Kantian epistemologies where the whole of life is reified by the principle of identity or representation. See Theodor Adorno, *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader* (New York, NY: Continuum, 1982).

<sup>23</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 101.

<sup>24</sup> See Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 10; cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), 228.

<sup>25</sup> See Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 3.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

there is anything certain in this philosophical gesture, it is the fact that a genealogy of a phenomenon includes a multiplicity of complex terrains, including nuances and tensions between the capitalization, totalization, and differentiation of forces.

The forces utilized in the activity of genealogy are related to an infinity of forces. Whereas in Buddhism, the self is conceived as a constitution of the five aggregates, in the Deleuze-Nietzschean context, the self is perceived as a materiality-in-transit containing an assemblage of quantitatively homogenous and qualitatively heterogeneous forces and bodies. In this vein, the self or an object is not to be understood based on its essential quiddity, but on its appearance as a relation between forces. Aside from Deleuze's early books such as *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, *Bergsonism* and *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, the importance of the struggle between different forces is likewise relatively underlined in his collaborative books. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, for example, Deleuze and Guattari claim: "We will ask what it functions with, in connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities, in which other multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed."<sup>28</sup> This topology of objects also finds its protean locale in *Anti-Oedipus*, where they theorize the subject as a mere by-product of different impressions, and agency is merely produced by its power to affect another body and the aptitude to be affected, respectively. Through the *conjunctive synthesis of consumption-consummation*, the subject is dispossessed from developing a hubristic attitude because it merely appears as a consequence of the selective process rendered by desire among manifold connective and disjunctive syntheses.<sup>29</sup>

Further, Nietzsche's post-humanity ushers us into a de-deified world of contingencies. For this reason, Deleuze argues that the notion of 'sense' must also be understood in the yardstick of constellation and multiplicity rather than of singularity or linearity. The differential element of origins likewise posits the pluralistic attributes of sense. This resonates with Nietzsche's philosophy of perspectivism, which Deleuze ponders to be one of philosophy's greatest achievements. But to avoid falling prey to the quicksand of anarchism, relativism, and even

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<sup>28</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 4.

<sup>29</sup> See Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 17-18.



nihilism, the latter transfigures genealogy as a tool of evaluation and interpretation.

Interpretation is a process that discloses the complexity of the genealogical critique. When there is a new force that seeks to appropriate or totalize a certain object, it must first put “on the mask of the forces which are already in possession of the object.”<sup>30</sup> Generally, this is a lucid illustration of genealogy as a creative immanent process. A genealogy of nihilism, therefore, espouses a search for the differential element of values from which its value is derived. It is a quest for the decadent or debased forces that appropriate and dominate it. When a genealogist-philosopher searches for the differential elements of the forces that engender nihilism, he or she must first practice the art of camouflaging in the guise of a priest, ascetic, and the religious—the dominant anthropological (and debased) symbols prior to his or her arrival.<sup>31</sup> As the philosopher penetrates the forces regulating or manipulating the object, he or she deterritorializes his or her mask toward the radicalization of debased forces and the creation of the new. Of course, the meaning of genealogical interpretation is as intricate as attempting to apply it in grasping the complex phenomenon of global capitalism. As a self-evolving principle, this contemporary mutation of capitalism consists of its own nuanced sets of ideological masks characterized by both oppressive and emancipatory propensities.

Nietzsche’s conceptualization of genealogy as evaluation and interpretation is not simply descriptive but is also critical and political. In a world blighted by nihilistic values, it is but a wickedness when genealogy limits itself to a mere description of the origin of values. There is no room for neutrality in this cultural malady. All evaluations of the origin of values depict ways of living in the same manner that all interpretations are symptoms of a typology of existence. Critically speaking, the main objective of genealogy is to articulate and promote affirmative or active thinking and living, capable of subverting the reactive values that have reigned Western philosophy since time immemorial. Therefore, genealogy does not only reevaluate and

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<sup>30</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 5.

<sup>31</sup> See *ibid.*

interpret, but it also engenders the creation of new values—the ‘new image of thought.’<sup>32</sup>

The creation of the new image of thought serves as a radical reconstruction of Kant’s critical philosophy,<sup>33</sup> which is a microcosm of Deleuze’s overall criticism of the dogmatic image of thought. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze profoundly describes the possibility of thinking in traditional philosophy: “We are told that the thinker ... wants and loves truth ... that thought as thought ... formally contains truth ... that thinking is the natural exercise of a faculty, that it is therefore sufficient to think ‘truly’.... We are also told that we are ‘diverted’ from the truth but by forces which are foreign to it (body, passions, sensuous interests).”<sup>34</sup> This philosophical error that bestows the thinker a hubristic mindset is the reason why metaphysics and science, especially during the Enlightenment period, transformed into a citadel of unenlightened optimism.<sup>35</sup> Enlightenment’s regression to savagery,<sup>36</sup> optimistically or blindly invigorates the undying quest for the genuine value of philosophy in our lives. In *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno critically opines,

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>33</sup> Deleuze argues that despite the brilliance of Kant’s critical philosophy, it fails to provide a genealogy of reason, thereby failing to come up with a total critique: “Kant merely pushed a very old conception of critique to the limit, a conception which saw critique as a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to knowledge and truth, but not on knowledge and truth themselves; a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to morality, but not on morality itself. Thus, total critique turns into the politics of compromise: even before the battle the spheres of influence have already been shared out” (Ibid., 89).

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 103.

<sup>35</sup> Nietzsche joins Spinoza and other anti-rationalist and anti-foundationalist thinkers in admonishing this thinking. For Spinoza, “No one has yet determined what the body can do ... For no one has yet come to know the structure of the body so accurately that he could explain all its functions” [Spinoza, *Ethics*, trans. by R.H.M. Elwes (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1951), 155-156].

<sup>36</sup> For Adorno and Horkheimer, the “Enlightenment ... has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters. Yet the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity. Enlightenment’s program was the disenchantment of the world. It wanted to dispel myths, to overthrow fantasy with knowledge” [Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, trans. by Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 1].

“Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, keeps itself alive because the moment to realize it was missed.”<sup>37</sup> Adorno buttresses Deleuze’s view that this philosophical hubris and error should induce philosophy to rethink its fundamental questions and to fashion new concepts that would perpetually agonize any representationalist or transcendental principles.<sup>38</sup>

As argued earlier, genealogy is both an evaluation and an interpretation, and its nobility or baseness is configured by the force responsible for its appropriation. When thought manifests active forces, it leads to an affirmative thumping of all that is decadent, dialectical, and negative toward new possibilities.<sup>39</sup> Nietzsche is undeniably the model for the active philosopher for Deleuze—a “physician who deciphers the symptoms of reaction and negativity, and an artist who creates a new image of thought and invents new forms for its articulation.”<sup>40</sup> Moreover, evaluation and interpretation are characterized by two dimensions—in their affirmative forms, the return of evaluation and interpretation is termed by Deleuze as the *Eternal Return*, and that which evaluates and interprets is referred to as the *Will to Power*.

### **The Capillaries of Nietzsche’s New Ontology: the Will to Power and the Eternal Return**

Nietzsche’s principle of the will to power is one of the most politically abused among his thoughts. It is misconstrued along the context of violent oppression of the weak by the strong or the clamor for power. However, such accusations are rooted from a slavish and negative view of life—a product of the old image of thought. It caricatures a despoiled image of the will to power. More importantly, these misconceptions become barriers in understanding the fecund ethics of life behind this principle.

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<sup>37</sup> Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, translated by E. B. Ashton (New York, NY: Continuum, 1999), 3.

<sup>38</sup> See Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988).

<sup>39</sup> See Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari*, 19.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

Nietzsche defines life as characterized by the will to power.<sup>41</sup> He highlights the role of the will in a being as a principle of affirmation. The value of the will to power is itself the value accorded to life. The Deleuzian appropriation of the will to power attempts to rescue Nietzsche from the various paradoxes generated by his polemics. Whereas Nietzsche's formulation attempts to veer away from Western transcendentalism, Deleuze's reformulation of the will to power gives Nietzsche a coherent yet nomadic face in the French intellectual tradition and the contemporary milieu.

In a world of becoming, fixed identities or absolutes find no place. As argued earlier, instead of dealing with essences or foundations, Deleuze claims that mankind should rather talk about the relation of forces or quanta that entails relations between bodies. He further argues that a body is defined by the relationship between antagonistic forces: "Every relation of forces constitutes a body... Being composed of a plurality of irreducible forces, the body is a multiple phenomenon; its unity is that of a multiple phenomenon. In a body, the superior or dominant are known as active and the inferior or dominated are known as reactive."<sup>42</sup> Forces can be understood via their difference in quantity and quality. The quality of forces is either *active* or *reactive*. Albeit the act of measuring forces sounds anti-Nietzschean and anti-Deleuzian, it crafts a space for the art of qualitative interpretation.<sup>43</sup> This is because a mere quantification of forces only results in abstractions or ambiguities. Additionally, the quantity and quality of forces in a particular relation maintain a differential relationship with others. As Deleuze further construes, "Difference in quantity is the essence of force and of the relation of force to force."<sup>44</sup> But, even though it appears that Nietzsche puts primacy to quantity in relation to the quiddity of forces alone, it must be clarified that he is not concerned with the irreducibility of quantity to quality. Rather, he is interested in the difference in quantity irreducible to quantity, which further calls for interpretation.

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<sup>41</sup> See Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 254.

<sup>42</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 40.

<sup>43</sup> See *ibid.*, 42.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.

Relation of forces is always composed of a relation of the dominant and dominated, in the same manner that each force bears a specific quality—either being an active or reactive force. Active forces are qualities of forces that appropriate, command, and control reactive ones.<sup>45</sup> Because these forces differentially flow within the master's body, they observe a pathos of distance from the reactive forces. On the contrary, reactive forces negate everything that is active, noble, or different from it in order to *be*. In this sense, its configurations are shaped by resentful and parasitic processes. Bizarrely, Deleuze emphasizes that it is possible for two active or reactive forces to collide, but it would always result in one force dominating or exploiting the other.

The relationship between forces still requires to be determined by an inner will that must be ascribed to it—the will to power. The 'will' in the will to power is a plastic principle inseparable "from particular determined forces, from their quantities, qualities, and directions. It is never superior to the ways that it determines a relation between forces, it is always plastic and changing."<sup>46</sup> Hence, the will to power neither refers to the universal will of Schopenhauer nor the individual of self-identical will of conventional psychology. It is the differential character of force and "the element from which derive both the quantitative difference of related forces and the quality that devolves into each force in this relation. The will to power here reveals its nature as the principle of the synthesis of forces. In this synthesis ... forces pass through the same differences again or diversity is reproduced."<sup>47</sup>

Moreover, the will to power is the genealogical element of forces that configures and delimits variations of forces and relation of bodies. It also serves as a determining principle for the relation of forces and bodies. This is made possible by virtue of the will to power's immanent relation to the forces it defines and delimits. Against Kantian immanent critique, Deleuze asserts that "only the will to power as genetic and genealogical principle, as legislative principle, is capable of realizing

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<sup>45</sup> See *ibid.*, 42.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 50

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

internal critique.”<sup>48</sup> The relation of forces is not pre-determined, and the configuration of an object’s essence depicts a multiplicity and dynamism of essences. All meanings or essences are products of or are subjected to variegated concatenations and becomings, which are determined by relation of forces.

The will to power, in addition, bears an aptitude of affectivity. This attribute is adjacent to Baruch Spinoza’s belief that the force of the body is a function of the number of ways in which it can be affected, and that a body’s capacity for being affected is an expression of its power.<sup>49</sup> In Spinoza’s materialist ontology, a body’s value or sense is determined by its capacity to affect other bodies and be affected by them.<sup>50</sup> However, it must be highlighted that in both Nietzschean and Spinozist contexts, the body’s capability of being affected is not identical to passivity, but to sensitivity, affectivity, and sensation.<sup>51</sup> The aforementioned characteristics signify that the will to power also includes a feeling of power. In fact, even before Nietzsche treated power within the context of the will, it was perennially a matter of feeling for him.<sup>52</sup> Based on these attributes, the will to power discloses its nature as the principle of the synthesis of forces wherein the body serves as the substratum. This is only possible because it acts as an inner center of forces—a power of becoming-active or becoming-reactive.

The body occupies an essential and revolutionary role in Nietzsche’s new ontology or immanent philosophy. However, the

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 91. The will to power as a genealogy is sustained by Deleuze in *Anti-Oedipus* where he traces morality in conjunction with memory to the debtor-creditor relation and the primitive practice of inflicting physical pains for unpaid debts (see Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 180).

<sup>49</sup> See Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari*, 23. Deleuze ponders Nietzsche as a Spinozist, along with Holderlin and Kleist. It is because their theorizations involve “speeds and slowness, of frozen catatonias, and accelerated movements, unformed elements, non-subjectified affects” [Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. by Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988), 129].

<sup>50</sup> See Deleuze, *Spinoza*, 125. Similar idea can be observed in *A Thousand Plateaus*: “It is no longer a question of organs and functions, and of a transcendent Plane ... It is a question not of organization, but of composition; not of development or differentiation but of movement and rest, speed and slowness” (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 255).

<sup>51</sup> See Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 62.

<sup>52</sup> Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 42.

claim that the body is a substratum or conduit to different forces is not exclusively Deleuzian in origin, especially in relation to the French reception of Nietzsche. Pierre Klossowski's *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle* joins Deleuze's *Nietzsche and Philosophy* in being two of the most influential literatures that reconstructed Nietzsche's philosophy in the French philosophical milieu.<sup>53</sup> Like Deleuze, Klossowski perceives the body as the locus and the product of impulses rather than as the self's property. In this regard, the body becomes "fortuitous; it is neither irreversible nor reversible, because its only history is that of the impulses."<sup>54</sup> Albeit both French scholars converge on the belief that the body is a substratum of forces or semiotic-configured impulses, Klossowski maintains that the powers of the body is comprehensible through the "intermediary of a language of signs that is fallaciously deciphered by consciousness."<sup>55</sup> And although he mentions about consciousness, he further argues that it is merely a "deciphering of the messages transmitted by the impulses."<sup>56</sup>

Further, within the will to power's territory, forces are informed by power, and power entails abundance. This is the reason why it is a misapprehension to define the will to power as a craving for power. The will does not desire power because it is by default a manifestation of power—although it can be advanced either affirmatively or negatively. Under the hands of the slave, the will to power becomes negative. Power is clamored by the slave because he or she lacks it. In the spirit of revenge, the slave commits a double-negation as a basis for his or her delusional notion of power. In fact, it is not the will that wills power because power eludes representation. If power is represented, it only entails that it is appropriated by the slave based on some default values.

Against this old image of thought, Nietzsche asserts that to will is to create new values. The will is creative because power is the one that

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<sup>53</sup> Before Michel Foucault bolstered his utmost respect for Deleuzian or Deleuzo-Guattarian scholarship (as expressed, for instance, in Foucault's "Preface" of *Anti-Oedipus*), he wrote a letter to Pierre Klossowski in 1969 praising the latter's book, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle* [Pierre Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, trans. by Daniel W. Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997)].

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

wills in the will, which means that “power is the genetic and differential element in the will.”<sup>57</sup> As Nietzsche explicates, the will to power serves as the source of meaning and value of all relations of forces because of its evaluative and interpretative capacities: it is “essentially creative and giving ... it does not desire ... it does not desire power. It gives.”<sup>58</sup> However, power’s necessary addition to force is only possible through the relational fuel of chance.

Chance is already immanent to the will to power, for it is the sole ethical principle that can affirm all chance. It is only by affirming chance that we can affirm the relation of all forces. In Deleuze’s description:

The will to power as a principle does not suppress chance, but implies it, because without chance it would be neither plastic nor changing. Chance is the bringing of forces into relation, the will to power is the determining principle of this relation. The will to power is a necessary addition to force but can only be added to forces brought into relation by chance.<sup>59</sup>

The affirmation of chance is only realizable through the concept of the eternal return. Informed by the atrocious emergence of a life devoid of traditional underpinning or a metaphysical guarantor, Nietzsche formulates the principle of the eternal return.

Nietzsche devises the eternal return as a litmus test to what kind of life we want to recur, i.e., whether an ascending or descending mode of life. Like his reconstruction of Nietzsche’s will to power, Deleuze’s appropriation of the eternal return also attempts to emancipate it from its reduction to a cosmological and identitarian theory. The eternal return, Deleuze asserts, is “the being of becoming itself, the being which is affirmed in becoming. The eternal return as law of becoming.”<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 85.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 97. Even though the will to power is a principle of creativity, the question: *How do reactive forces of nihilism dominate in active ones in the history of Western philosophy?* remains an intricate problem lingering in Nietzsche’s philosophy.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.



After God's death, the world appears as devoid of teleological ramifications. This world consists of divergent forces and contrasting perspectives, wherein people become not only as manifestation of forces and power, but also as dice-players. In this world of becoming, Deleuze describes that there "is only a single dicethrow, which due to the number of the combination produced, comes to reproduce itself as such .... The dice which are thrown once are the affirmation of chance, the combination which they form on falling is the affirmation of necessity."<sup>61</sup> In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze reconstructs the conventional Nietzschean distinction between the master and the slave through the dialectical relation between the *good* and the *bad dice-player*. The good player embodies the Dionysian correlation of chance and necessity. It is not a probability distributed over numerous throws but all chance at once, "not a final desired combination, but the fatal combination, fatal and loved, not the return of combination by the number of throws, but the repetition of a dicethrow by the nature of the fatally obtained number."<sup>62</sup> Meanwhile, the bad player counts on several throws of the dice. Through the utilization of causality and probability, the dicethrow fails or is not comprehended affirmatively because chance is not affirmed enough in one throw: "To abolish chance by holding it in the grip of causality and finality, to count on the repetition of throws rather than affirming chance, to anticipate a result instead of affirming necessity — these are all the operations of a bad player."<sup>63</sup>

In the dicethrow world, the eternal return functions as the law of becoming. As a cosmological doctrine, it diverges from the equilibrium principle because it espouses a recurrence of difference, and not of the *Same*.<sup>64</sup> This theorization of the eternal return is evidently informed by Nietzsche's anti-Platonist stance. Of course, Plato's adherence to the principle of being is inimical to life's material vitality, specifically to the creative potentialities of the body. Nietzsche's inversion of the Platonic metaphysics opens us to a world of chance and possibilities.

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<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 25-26.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>64</sup> See Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 41.

Like Spinoza, Nietzsche is a philosopher of univocity. However, although being is univocal, it does not prevent us from fashioning novel events and virtualities. Understanding the eternal return in conjunction with the principle of univocity transports us to a plane of immanence whose future is characterized by disruption and undecidability. If being is univocal, all manifestations of life, eruptions of events, and faces of the future will be an actualization of this immanent life, which can incessantly and differentially craft new experiences, affects, and concepts.<sup>65</sup> Although the future is non-unitarian or non-teleological, the eternal return perpetually allows humanity to affirm life as the ritornello of difference. In this realm, repetition of the same is ludicrous, for it is only possible in an equivocal world or in a world of equilibrium.<sup>66</sup> Therefore, every repetition is an occurrence of the new, in the same manner that the univocity of being produces an infinity of difference.

In *Anti-Oedipus*, an analogous explication of the eternal return as the recurrence of difference is elucidated. Deleuze and Guattari organically inoculate the eternal return doctrine in their discussion of the *disjunctive synthesis of recording*, specifically, in relation to the mechanical repetition of identity.<sup>67</sup> Primarily, they formulate the psyche as a locus of differential recording of past objects of satisfaction. As a critique to Sigmund Freud's metaphysical or identitarian conceptualization of repetition, they propose a differentialization of repetition in psychic life. In this sense, pleasure is emancipated from metaphysical repetition and linear temporality, i.e., from a reactive repetition anchored on a fixation to the past toward an active repetition of difference.

Just to set things into perspective, it is not being that recurs in the eternal return doctrine. Rather, it is the very recurrence itself that returns—"it is the one thing which is affirmed of diversity and multiplicity."<sup>68</sup> If there is a room for the concept identity in the eternal return, it is the protean and rhizomic nature of the event of returning

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<sup>65</sup> Adrian Parr ed., *The Deleuze Dictionary* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 296.

<sup>66</sup> See Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 46.

<sup>67</sup> See Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 75-83.

<sup>68</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 48.

itself—the identity of that which differs. This makes the eternal return the “synthesis of time as a synthesis; a synthesis of time and its dimensions, a synthesis of diversity and its reproduction, a synthesis of becoming and the being which is affirmed in becoming, a synthesis of double affirmation.”<sup>69</sup> Speaking of synthesis, the will to power serves as the synthesis of the eternal return, which is itself a synthesis. Therefore, the will to power is the synthesis and determining principle of the differential element of forces and the eternal return.

The concept of the eternal return is Nietzsche's alternative to a world of transcendence. He argues that living in a world governed by an endless recurrence of difference transfigures the world into a *chaosmos* where cosmos is understood as chaos, and vice-versa. *Chaosmos* illustrates a dice-playing existence capable of producing both good and bad dice-players. In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze narrates that the “the secret of the eternal return is that it does not express an order opposed to the chaos engulfing it. On the contrary, it is nothing other than chaos itself, or the power of affirming chaos... To the coherence of representation, the eternal return substitutes something else entirely – its own *chaodysey*.”<sup>70</sup>

As an ethical doctrine, the eternal return involves a radical moment of selection. In doing so, it becomes an alternative to Christianity's *Golden Mean* and the Kantian *Categorical Imperative*. Creatively, Deleuze converts the famous Kantian universalizability principle into: “Whatever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return.”<sup>71</sup> This innovative Deleuzian theorization parallels with Bernd Magnus's formulation of the *existential imperatives*. In *Nietzsche's Existential Imperatives*, Magnus asserts that the “eternal recurrence may perhaps be said to function as a postulate eternalizing life, with the corresponding exultation or despair which such a realization would bring to an individual. Ontologically, the doctrine of eternal recurrence may be said to function as a reevaluation of values, challenging traditional metaphysics, Christianity, and nihilism through the transformation of a

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, trans. by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, Constantin Boundas eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 264.

<sup>71</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 68.

'beyond' into an eternal 'now.'<sup>72</sup> Magnus's existential imperatives finds a relevant expression in Deleuze's archipelago through the latter's formulation of the ascending life-typology. In essence, the ascending life-typology illustrates an active and noble affirmation of life including its return *contra* a typology characterized by degeneration and sickness—the descending life-typology.

What enlivens Klossowski's *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle* is his critical and crafty disquisition of the eternal return doctrine where Nietzsche's sick body, madness, and appalling life serve as the points of departure. Additionally, it underlines the parallelism between Klossowski's and Deleuze's theorizations of the descending and the ascending life typologies.

As argued earlier, Nietzsche wrestled with the question on how to give meaning and goal to existence in the post-death of God world. With an ethical tone, he writes: "If no goal resides in the whole history of human destinies, then one must be inserted into it: assuming that a goal is necessary for us, and on the other hand, that the illusion of an immanent end has become transparent to us. A goal is necessary for us because a will is necessary for us..."<sup>73</sup> Klossowski supposes that Nietzsche tried to make sense of this quandary through the engineering of two oscillating philosophical routes. The first is grounded on the principle of the eternal return, "in which the universe 'explicates' itself," while the second is informed by the phenomenon of nihilism that led history undergo "a revaluation of values, which will institute criteria for a new 'selection' of the species."<sup>74</sup>

The eternal return poses as an alternative to the Darwinian theory of natural selection viewed by Nietzsche as merely gracious to the last man or the slave. The challenge of formulating an alternative fuels Nietzsche's tripartite problematization of the eternal return doctrine,

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<sup>72</sup> Bernd Magnus, *Nietzsche's Existential Imperative* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 117; cf. Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 47-49; cf. Bernd Magnus, *Heidegger's Metahistory of Philosophy: Amor Fati, Being and Truth* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970).

<sup>73</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Samtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe*, Vol. 12, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), p. 236, 6[9], Summer 1886-Spring 1887.

<sup>74</sup> Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, 123.

hence, the concept of the *vicious circle*. By virtue of this novel concept, Nietzsche interrogates how the eternal return doctrine clashes with its scientific appropriation (or what Deleuze associates with the principle of equilibrium),<sup>75</sup> with his other principles, and more importantly, with his sanity. At the same time, this concept radically engenders us to “dismantle our mechanisms,”<sup>76</sup> or assume the shoes of others with a new life-typology to accept. These moments of tensions and dismantlement prompt Nietzsche to conceptualize two differing philosophical pathways. The first deals with the exoteric’s perspective that subjects humanity into a “test; the result: a new species, or rather, the attaining of a higher level through which every orientation, every decision, and all behaviour would be changed.”<sup>77</sup> Meanwhile, the second is grounded on the esoteric’s viewpoint where the eternal return as a form of decision-making will occur in secret (the vicious circle) or “*in the name of this secret by certain ... Masters of the Earth.*”<sup>78</sup>

These two relatively divergent perspectives are analogous to Deleuze’s theorization of the eternal return as a physical and ethical principle. In nuancing the latter, Deleuze introduces the distinction between becoming-active and becoming-reactive. Of course, the eternal return as an ethical principle maintains penchant towards becoming-active instead of becoming-reactive (the territory of the bad dice-player). Deleuze stresses that it is only becoming-active which is constitutive of being because only the good dice-player is capable of affirmatively embracing chance or the return. Deleuze cogently elucidates:

The being of becoming cannot be fully affirmed without also affirming the existence of becoming-active. The eternal return thus has a double aspect: it is the universal being of becoming, but the universal being of becoming ought to belong to a single becoming. Only becoming-active has a being which is the being of the whole of becoming. Returning is everything but everything is affirmed in a single moment. Insofar as

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<sup>75</sup> See Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 46.

<sup>76</sup> Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, 123.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 124.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 125.

the eternal return is affirmed as the universal being of becoming, insofar as becoming-active is also affirmed as the symptom and product of the universal eternal return, affirmation changes nuance and becomes more and more profound. Eternal return, as a physical doctrine, affirms the being of becoming. But, as selective ontology, it affirms this being of becoming as the 'self-affirming' of becoming-active.<sup>79</sup>

The 'return' in the eternal returns selects. It selects forces based on the will to power's quantity. The eternal return provides an opportunity for the double affirmation of becoming and of the being of becoming. These two moments involving the dice-playing event elicit a concurrent double process of selection by virtue of the force's activity and the will's affirmation. Because the eternal return presupposes a critique of the principle of identity and the notion of perfect equilibrium, the act of willing is a willing of chance and chaos—an intrepid affirmation of multiplicity by the dice-player. In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze further contends that, "The secret of the eternal return is that it does not express an order opposed to the chaos engulfing it. On the contrary, it is nothing other than chaos itself, or the power of affirming chaos."<sup>80</sup> The affirmation of multiplicity is tantamount to the affirmation of becoming. Consequently, because values are not anymore grounded on a transcendental plane, the question on how we view life and expend our potentialities then assumes a superlative importance. But this problem only achieves its maximum when answered concomitantly with the question on the meaning of the eternal return. The sum of these two questions bedrocks the philosophical anatomy of the eternal return.

On the one hand, the value of life depends on whether people recognize their life as either ascending or descending. The manner on how they value life is determined by the value of power they expend. On the other, the affirmation or negation of the return of a life depends on whether people assume the model of the good or the bad dice-player. The very act of selection in the moment of the eternal return "makes willing something whole. The thought of the eternal return eliminates from willing everything which falls outside the eternal return, it makes

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<sup>79</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 72.

<sup>80</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 263.

willing a creation, it brings about the equation ‘willing = creating.’”<sup>81</sup> However, there remain some unscathed reactive forces—the more developed ones fueled by nihilistic will capable of repelling the first selection. The said finitude necessitates a movement toward the second selection.

Another intriguing aspect of the eternal return is premised on the rather obscure idea that the “eternal return is the most extreme form of nihilism.”<sup>82</sup> It is described as extreme because the nihilism corrupting European modernity is incomplete. The will to nothingness (the nucleus of nihilism) repudiates the production of the active force and engenders it to turn against itself.<sup>83</sup> As such, the will to nothingness establishes the foundations for the conservation, victory, and contamination of reactive forces. Since these practices cultivate the will to nothingness as the universal becoming-reactive of forces, this makes nihilism an incomplete phenomenon. When the nihilistic will is perceived in conjunction with the eternal return, the former is disconnected from the reactive force. The end of nihilism’s alliance with the reactive force engenders its completion “because it makes negation a negation of reactive forces themselves. By virtue of the eternal return, nihilism no longer expresses itself as the conservation and victory of the weak but as their destruction, their self-destruction.”<sup>84</sup>

From the eternal return’s antagonism to reactive forces initiated in the first selection, it sequentially transforms into a destruction of reactive forces. Albeit destruction appears as a negative process, it is an active form of annihilation or genealogical critique—an expression of becoming-active of forces whereby sturdy spirits immanently annihilates the reactive.<sup>85</sup> As the reactive terrain of the will to nothingness is undermined, reactive forces metamorphose into an active power of affirmation. Deleuze puts forth in *Difference and Repetition*: “the eternal return is a vertiginous movement endowed with a force: not one which causes the return of the Same in general, but one which selects, one

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>82</sup> Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 36.

<sup>83</sup> See Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 69.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 70.

<sup>85</sup> See Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 8; cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. with commentary by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).

which expels as well as creates, destroys as well as produces?.”<sup>86</sup> The creative dialectic between annihilation and affirmation actualizes the profound form of the eternal return as a second selection. It is in this sense that Deleuze elucidates the secret power and genealogical character of the eternal return:

The eternal return produces becoming-active. It is sufficient to relate the will to nothingness to the eternal return in order to realize that reactive forces do not return. However, ... deep the becoming-reactive of forces, reactive forces will not return. The ... reactive man will not return. In and through the eternal return negation as a quality of the will to power transmutes itself into affirmation, it becomes an affirmation of negation itself, it becomes a power of affirming, an affirmative power.<sup>87</sup>

In a world where the principles of the will to power and eternal return act as essential pillars of life, the Overman metamorphoses as the new symbol of a post-humanity—the new image of thought. As the new meaning of the world, the Overman must fully comprehend the will to power as the principle of the synthesis of forces and the eternal return as a cosmological and ethical theory. For both Nietzsche and Deleuze, these affirmative goals introduce humanity once more to a new plane of accidents and contingencies—*chaosmos*.

## CONCLUSION

In this paper, I present Deleuze’s critical reconstruction of the fundamental Nietzschean principles, namely, genealogy, will to power, and the eternal return. In addition, I briefly engage with the works of other Nietzschean scholars, namely, Magnus and Klossowski, to ameliorate my discussion of the principle of the will to power and the doctrine of the eternal return. Two of the most significant lessons that Deleuze learned from Nietzsche, is the value of genealogy as a principle of critique, interpretation, and creation; and, the self-reflexive and nomadic quest for new ways of thinking and living through the will

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<sup>86</sup> Deleuze and Parnett, *Dialogues II*, 11.

<sup>87</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 71.



to power and the eternal return. Such a nomadic venture parallels with Deleuze's theorization of the principle of *becoming-imperceptible*. In *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life*, he describes life as:

[A] haecceity no longer of individuation, but of singularization ... neutral, beyond good and evil.... The life of such individuality fades away in favor of the singular life immanent to a man who no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken for no other.... A life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given living subject goes through and that are measured by given lived objects.... This indefinite life does not itself have moments ... but only between-times, between-moments.... The singularities and the events that constitute a life coexist with the accidents of the life that corresponds to it, but they are neither grouped nor divided in the same way. They connect with one another in a manner entirely different from how individuals connect.<sup>88</sup>

Moreover, Deleuze's engagement with Nietzschean philosophy is incomplete without an elucidation of the Nietzsche-Hegel encounter. Indubitably, it can comprehensively show us Deleuze's abhorrence to the Hegelian dialectic and teleology, albeit not to the entire Hegelian philosophy. More importantly, it can illustrate Deleuze's attempt to critically distance himself from Nietzsche through the theories of multiplicity and difference-in-itself which the former expounded in *Difference and Repetition*. In addition, an exploration of Deleuze's *Nietzsche* rhizomically extends to Deleuze's engagement with other maverick philosophers immensely influential in his early thinking, namely, Spinoza, Hume, and Bergson. On the other side of the coin, one can also venture into other or new literatures on Nietzschean scholarship, authored by Karl Löwith, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Gianni Vattimo, and Peter Sloterdijk, to name a few. I excluded these topics because they deserve respective full-blown discussions.

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<sup>88</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life*, trans. by Anne Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2002), 29-30.

In Deleuze's collaborative scholarship with Guattari like *A Thousand Plateaus* and *Anti-Oedipus*, difference as the new image of thought differentially transforms into desire, rhizome, and contingency. The said reconfigurations affirmatively contemporize the importance of Nietzschean concepts, such as the will to power being transfigured into desire or desiring-production. More importantly, Deleuze and Guattari transfigure difference into a more molecular, socially embedded, and revolutionary concept that can be utilized to critique the most hazardous mutation of transcendental philosophy and chaos today—neoliberal capitalism.

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